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BIG BROTHER AS PARENT:  
USING SURVEILLANCE TO PATROL 
STUDENTS’ INTERNET SPEECH 
CATHERINE E. MENDOLA* 
Abstract: With the pervasiveness of the Internet in students’ lives, schools are 
frequently disrupted by their students’ online speech, whether through threats of 
violence, cyberbullying, or discussion of self-harm. To combat and minimize 
these disturbances, some schools are turning to third-party surveillance compa-
nies to monitor students’ Internet posts for potentially harmful speech. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has never addressed a school’s relationship to its students’ Inter-
net postings. In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, lower courts rely pri-
marily on a 1969 free speech ruling from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, which asks whether a student’s speech substantially 
disrupts the educational process. If it does, a school may punish the student for 
that speech. This Note analyzes the effects that Internet surveillance could have 
on students and advocates that the Supreme Court grant certiorari to student In-
ternet speech cases and adopt a risk of substantial disruption standard. Addition-
ally, proactive schools should substitute Internet surveillance with an increase in 
tech-savvy counselors and social media education, each of which may positively 
guide students toward responsible Internet behavior. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Drink bleach and die,” one bully wrote to twelve-year-old Rebecca Ann 
Sedwick.1 “Why are you still alive?” another asked.2 A third text message sent 
by a peer to Sedwick’s cell phone read, “Can u [sic] die please?”3 After over 
one year of online and in-person bullying, Sedwick’s bullies’ requests were 
answered as she leapt to her death at an abandoned cement factory near her 
home in central Florida.4 Though Sedwick had barely attended middle school, 
                                                                                                                           
 * Executive Notes Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2014–2015. 
 1 Lizette Alvarez, Felony Counts for Two in Suicide of Bullied Twelve-Year-Old, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 16, 2013, at A20. 
 2 Emily Bazelon, Bullies Taunted Rebecca Ann Sedwick with Texts Like “Can u Die Please?” 
and Then She Did, SLATE (Sept. 18, 2013, 2:23 PM) http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2013/
09/18/rebecca_ann_sedwick_suicide_lessons_for_parents_in_the_scary_age_of_cyberbullying.html. 
 3 Id. 
 4 See Alvarez, supra note 1. One news report estimated that Sedwick was bullied by as many as 
fifteen girls through online message boards and text messages. Rachel Quigley, ‘Yes I Bullied Her, 
She Killed Herself and I Don’t Give a ****’: Girls, Twelve and Fourteen, Whose Cyber-Stalking 
‘Drove Fellow Pupil, Twelve, to Suicide’ Are Arrested. DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 15, 2013, 3:03 
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she had experienced deep pain.5 The chilling words remained in her journal as 
proof following her suicide: “Every day more and more kids kill themselves 
because of bullying. How many lives have to be lost until people realize words 
do matter?”6 
Following Sedwick’s September 2013 suicide, fingers pointed every-
where: at her parents for not monitoring her Internet and cell phone usage, at 
her school for not identifying her bullies, at the young girls who bullied her, 
and at the bullies’ parents for not controlling their children.7 Five weeks after 
her death, a twelve-year-old former friend of Sedwick’s and a fourteen-year-
old former schoolmate were arrested in connection with her death and charged 
with aggravated stalking, a third-degree felony in Florida.8 The most damning 
evidence against either was a Facebook post allegedly authored by the four-
teen-year-old, which stated, “Yes IK [I know] I bullied REBECCA nd [sic] she 
killed her self [sic] but IDGAF [I don’t give a f—–].”9 Upon seeing the blatant 
disregard for human life in this post, Polk County Sheriff Grady Judd moved 
quickly to apprehend the fourteen-year-old author and her twelve-year-old 
friend.10 Sheriff Judd’s justification for prompt action was fear that the girls 
would bully others.11 
Today’s preteens have never known a world without the Internet.12 Its ac-
cessible nature permeates all aspects of their lives, from use as an educational 
                                                                                                                           
PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2460996/Rebecca-Ann-Sedwick-suicide-2-girls-aged-
12-14-arrested-stalking.html. 
 5 See Quigley, supra note 4; Mike Schneider & Jennifer Kay, Rebecca Ann Sedwick Suicide: Two 
Girls Arrested for ‘Terrorizing’ Bullied Victim, HUFFPOST MIAMI (last updated Jan. 23, 2014, 6:58 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/15/rebecca-ann-sedwick_n_4100350.html. 
 6 See Quigley, supra note 4. 
 7 See Alvarez, supra note 1. In response to the fourteen-year-old’s Facebook posting, Polk Coun-
ty Sheriff Judd Grady, “[b]rimming with outrage and incredulity . . . reserved his harshest words for 
the girl’s parents for failing to monitor her behavior, after she had been questioned by the police, and 
for allowing her to keep her cellphone.” Id. The sheriff stated that he was aggravated because “the 
parents are not doing what parents should do: after she is questioned and involved in this, why does 
she even have a device? Parents, who instead of taking that device and smashing it into a thousand 
pieces in front of that child, say her account was hacked.” Id. 
 8 See Alvarez, supra note 1; Rebecca Ann Sedwick Suicide: Two Arrests Made in Death of Bullied 
Florida Girl, CBS NEWS (Oct. 15, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/rebecca-ann-
sedwick-suicide-2-arrests-made-in-death-of-bullied-florida-girl [hereinafter CBS]. 
 9 See Quigley, supra note 4; Schneider & Kay, supra note 5. 
 10 See Alvarez, supra note 1. 
 11 Quigley, supra note 4; CBS, supra note 8. Indeed, CBS reported, upon her arrest, the fourteen-
year-old was “very cold,” and “had no emotion at all . . . .” CBS, supra note 8. In November 2013, the 
charges were dropped against both girls, as investigators determined that despite thousands of Face-
book messages, their ugly conduct did not rise to the level of a crime. Lizette Alvarez, Charges 
Dropped in Florida Cyberbullying Death, but Sheriff Isn’t Backing Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 
2013, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/charges-dropped-against-florida-
girls-accused-in-cyberbullying-death.html. 
 12 Alex Vadukul, In a Queens School, an Early Start on Preparing ‘Responsible Digital Citizens,’ 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2014, at A24; Dinesh Ramde, College Freshmen Never Knew a World Without 
2015] Using Private Surveillance to Patrol Students’ Online Behavior 155 
aid in schools to entertainment at home.13 As students learn these and other 
technological innovations, parents often struggle to keep pace with their tech-
savvy children.14 Not knowing what technology exists, coupled with an inabil-
ity to monitor that technology, leaves many children without parental controls, 
producing an ongoing opportunity for children and teenagers to communi-
cate—for better or for worse—with one another.15 What may result is a seem-
ingly limitless virtual playground that emboldens students, creating a troubling 
amount of freedom for such malleable minds.16 Absent oversight, students are 
left to their own devices, able to make independent, potentially dangerous 
moves in their otherwise micromanaged worlds.17 The independence that stu-
dents exercise may simply be speech, but as demonstrated through the case of 
Rebecca Sedwick, speech may target other students and leave permanent 
scars.18 
                                                                                                                           
the Net, BOSTON.COM (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2011/08/24/
college_freshmen_never_knew_a_world_without_the_net. 
 13 See Amanda Lenhart et al., Teens, Kindness and Cruelty on Social Network Sites, PEW RES. 
CENTER 2 (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP_
Teens_Kindness_Cruelty_SNS_Report_Nov_2011_FINAL_110711.pdf (discussing social media and 
experiencing online cruelty through social media); Mary Madden et al., Teens and Technology 2013, 
PEW RES. CENTER 2 (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/
2013/PIP_TeensandTechnology2013.pdf. These studies also reported that 95% of American teenagers 
use the Internet, and 47% of American teenagers own a smart phone. Lenhart et al., supra; Madden et 
al., supra. 
 14 See Lizette Alvarez, Girl’s Suicide Points to Rise in Apps Used by Cyberbullies, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 14, 2013, at A1; Bob Sullivan, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt Kids, MSNBC.COM, http://
www.nbcnews.com/id/3078811/ns/technology_and_science-security (last visited Oct. 13 2014). The 
popular ABC sitcom “Modern Family” has a father notorious for his cluelessness about his children. 
See Josh Jackson, The 20 Best Phil Dunphy Quotes, PASTE MAGAZINE (Jul. 21, 2012, 8:45 AM), 
http://www.pastemagazine.com/blogs/lists/2012/07/the-20-best-phil-dunphy-quotes.html. In the 
show’s pilot, he says, “I’m a cool dad, that’s my thang. I’m hip, I surf the web, I text. LOL: laugh out 
loud, OMG: oh my god, WTF: why the face,” exhibiting a very common parental misstep: thinking 
they understand what their children are saying through Internet abbreviations. See id. 
 15 See Mary Madden et al., Parents, Teens, and Online Privacy, PEW RES. CENTER 2, 3 (Nov. 14, 
2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_ParentsTeensAndPrivacy.
pdf. A November 2012 Pew Research study found that fifty percent of parents of teenagers who use 
the Internet have used parental controls “or other means of blocking, filtering, or monitoring their 
child’s online activities . . . .” Id. 
 16 See generally Jan Hoffman, Online Bullies Pull Schools into the Fray, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 
2010, at A1 (discussing cyberbullying and “cyberspace’s escalation of adolescent viciousness”). 
 17 See, e.g., Jim Taylor, Is Technology Creating a Generation of Bad Decision Makers?, PSY-
CHOL. TODAY (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-power-prime/201301/is-
technology-creating-generation-bad-decision-makers (explaining that recent developments in technol-
ogy make “poor decision making easier, more immediate, and more widely consequential,” and that 
technology discourages deliberation “and promotes acting on [kids’] most base impulses, emotions, 
and needs”); Kelly Wallace, ‘BatDad’ and Other Parents: To Post or Not to Post?, CNN.COM (Oct. 7, 
2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/07/living/parents-kids-online-privacy/ (stressing the 
importance of explaining to children the longevity of Internet posts). 
 18 See Tamara Lush, Florida Girl Was Bullied for Months Before Suicide, ASSOCIATED PRESS: 
THE BIG STORY (Sept. 13, 2013, 5:13 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/florida-girl-was-bullied-
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In addition to cyberbullying, students use online speech in a variety of 
negative ways, free from monitoring or discipline.19 Unaware or simply indif-
ferent to the repercussions of public postings on the Internet, students have 
unveiled violent plans against themselves and others, including bomb threats 
and school shootings.20 They have discussed eating disorders, underage drink-
ing, sexual encounters, and drug use.21 Students have also criticized teachers 
and school administration.22 Regardless of a student’s motive—a cry for help, 
boredom, or peer pressure—a student’s out-of-school Internet speech often has 
an impact on his educational environment, his peers, and his community.23 
The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to rule on any cases involving stu-
dent Internet conduct.24 Without Supreme Court guidance around this topic, 
                                                                                                                           
months-suicide (“The case has illustrated, once more, the ways in which youngsters are using the 
Internet to torment others.”); Schneider & Kay, supra note 5. 
 19 E.g., Benjamin Swasey, Student Charged for Bomb Threats at Harvard, 90.9 WBUR (Dec. 17, 
6:50 PM), http://www.wbur.org/2013/12/17/harvard-bomb-hoax-student-charges (reporting on Har-
vard undergraduate student who used the Internet to email in a bomb threat at Harvard during an ex-
amination period). 
 20 See id.; McKinney Police Arrest Juvenile After Facebook Post About Mass Shooting at McKin-
ney Boyd High School, MCKINNEY ONLINE (Oct. 2012), http://www.mckinneyonline.com/October-
2012/McKinney-Police-Arrest-Juvenile-after-Facebook-Post-about-Mass-Shooting-at-McKinney-
Boyd-High-School/. 
 21 See, e.g., Connor Ryan, ‘Joke’ Rape Confession Rocks Boston College, USA TODAY, (Oct. 3, 
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/03/bc-sexual-assault-confessions/2917835 
(discussing a Boston College student’s post on a public Facebook group about his alleged sexual assaults 
of other students on campus). 
 22 See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that school officials did not 
violate a student’s First Amendment rights when it prevented her from running for student govern-
ment because of a blog entry she authored on her home computer during non-school hours that criti-
cized the school’s decision about a campus event); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. 
Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (holding in favor of student free speech when student created a 
webpage that criticized administration and invited students to contact the principal about complaints). 
 23 See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, Warily, Schools Watch Students on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
29, 2013, at A1 (noting students’ various motives for posting on the Internet), Liz Heron, When a 
Facebook Post Is a Cry for Help, NYTIMES BLOG (Feb. 23, 2012, 11:20 PM), http://parenting.blogs.
nytimes.com/2012/02/23/when-a-facebook-post-is-a-cry-for-help (discussing teenage use of social 
media as a means to simply “pour out their feelings” but also to forecast serious issues such as 
thoughts of suicide). 
 24 Robyn Hagan Cain, Supreme Court Denies Cert in Student Free Speech Rights Cases, 
FINDLAW (Jan 17, 2012, 12:02 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/supreme_court/2012/01/supreme-court-
denies-cert-in-student-free-speech-rights-cases.html; David Kravets, Supreme Court Rejects Student 
Social-Media Cases, WIRED (Jan. 17, 2012, 1:30 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/01/
scotus-student-social-media/; see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. 
Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-461) [hereinafter Kowalski Certiorari Petition]. On De-
cember 1, 2014, the Supreme Court heard arguments for an Internet free speech case that involved 
explicit and threatening posts toward the defendant’s ex-wife and former coworkers. See Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 4–7, Elonis v. United States, 730 F.3d 323, 324–26 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 13-983) 
[hereinafter Elonis Certiorari Petition]; Elonis v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 1, 2014), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/elonis-v-united-states/. The defendant was a twenty-
seven-year-old male, and the case did not involve any school or student. See Elonis Certiorari Petition, 
supra, at 4–5 (describing defendant as a man with two children and a job). Both lower courts that 
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lower courts and ultimately individual schools must make independent deci-
sions regarding the safety and privacy of their students.25 In January 2012, the 
Court denied certiorari for three cases involving student Internet speech, any of 
which could have established necessary guidelines for school action in re-
sponse to student Internet speech.26 The U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal are split 
on the question of when a school may discipline its students for Internet 
speech, which increases the difficulty that schools face in determining when 
they should intervene to punish students for Internet speech that affects the 
school environment.27 
A school’s action in response to its students’ Internet postings has several 
characteristics that make it distinct from a strict free speech issue.28 Although 
Internet posts may be created off-campus, on a student’s own property, and on 
a student’s own time, they may still affect the school.29 With the advent of 
smartphones and the accessibility of the Internet, when a student leaves school, 
she does not necessarily leave her bullies; in-person bullying can be easily 
                                                                                                                           
analyzed the matter—the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit—analyzed his conduct under a true threat standard. See United 
States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 327–30 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Elonis, 897 F. Supp. 2d 335, 
345–46 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
 25 See, e.g., Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, 526 F. App’x 537, 545 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 790 (2013) (discussing lack of Supreme Court guidance on students’ out-of-school online speech 
in a case involving a nursing student’s MySpace blog); see also Sengupta, supra note 23 (discussing 
the increasing use of online surveillance companies by schools and the question of their legality by 
critics). 
 26 Cain, supra note 24; Kravets, supra note 24 (stating that courts have “been all over the map on 
the First Amendment issue because they maintain they have been saddled with a Vietnam War-era 
high court precedent that predates the Internet”); see Yoder, 526 F. App’x at 545; Nixon v. Hardin 
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 988 F. Supp. 2d 826, 836 (W.D. Tenn. 2013) (pointing out that the Supreme Court 
has not considered whether schools may regulate off-campus online speech by students and therefore 
“the parties here rely on decisions from other circuits”). 
 27 Compare Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing 
displeasure of the judiciary with the ability of a school to punish a student for off-campus social media 
postings on MySpace and granting summary judgment to the student for freedom of speech), and J.S. 
ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 829 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that a student-
made MySpace page about her principal did not rise to the level of substantial disruption to warrant 
the student’s punishment), with Doninger, 527 F.3d at 53 (deferring to schools’ ability to punish stu-
dents whose off-campus online social media use substantially disrupts a school). In Layshock, the 
Third Circuit warned against overreaching by schools into off-campus online speech: “It would be an 
unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of school authorities, to reach into a 
child’s home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that it can control that child when 
he/she participates in school sponsored activities.” 650 F.3d at 216. 
 28 See John T. Ceglia, Comment, The Disappearing Schoolhouse Gate: Applying Tinker in the 
Internet Age, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 939, 940 (2012) (noting that “[a]s the Internet permeates further and 
further into the daily lives of Americans, it continues to blur the once well-established separations 
between home and work, and school and play”). 
 29 See, e.g., Doninger, 527 F.3d at 43 (discussing Free Speech on a student’s out-of-school 
webpage); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (discussing Free Speech on a 
student’s out-of-school Facebook group). 
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continued at home on the Internet.30 Moreover, students are using the Internet 
to communicate about school, in ways in which administrators lack guidance 
over how they should respond.31 In the face of uncertainty, schools must walk 
on a tightrope, balancing students’ First Amendment rights on the Internet with 
their safety and well-being.32 Although the Supreme Court has thus far declined 
to address a school’s ability to act on its students’ Internet postings, students’ use 
of the Internet is unavoidable, and the Court must weigh in on reality.33 
As technology continues to advance, Supreme Court guidance from 1969 
involving symbolic speech remains the basis for students’ Internet free speech 
rights.34 Ultimately, it is unclear which rights should be prioritized: the rights 
of students to speak freely or all students’ rights to a safe educational environ-
ment.35 This Note argues that professional surveillance of student Internet 
postings is ineffective and corrosive to a trusting relationship between students 
and their schools. Part I of this Note provides the legal history of students’ free 
speech rights, outlining when a school may hold a student liable for his speech. 
Part II discusses current efforts at student surveillance. Part III analyzes the 
issues that school officials could address if they choose to proactively monitor 
students’ Internet speech and highlights issues that may stem from these ef-
forts. Part IV recommends that the Supreme Court grant certiorari for Internet 
student speech cases, outlines potential standards for the Court to adopt, and 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See Deborah Ahrens, Schools, Cyberbullies, and the Surveillance State, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1669, 1694–95 (2012) (explaining cyberbullying of students while they are at home). Rebecca Ann 
Sedwick was pushed in the hallway and taunted in person, in addition to the cyberbullying that she 
experienced on her cellphone. See Schneider & Kay, supra note 5. 
 31 See J.S., 650 F.3d at 920 (case involving a student-made MySpace page about her principal); 
Doninger, 527 F.3d at 43 (case in which a student’s blog criticized the cancellation of her high 
school’s event); Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1367 (case involving a student-made webpage about a 
teacher, calling her “the worst teacher I’ve ever met”). 
 32 See also Kravets, supra note 24 (noting “[t]he ubiquitous use of social networking and other 
forms of online communication has resulted in a stunning increase in harmful student expression that 
school administrators are forced to address with no clear guiding jurisprudence”). Compare, Don-
inger, 527 F.3d at 43 (finding student’s blog entry that criticized her school could be the subject of 
discipline by school officials) with Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1372–74 (finding student’s webpage 
about teacher did not create a substantial disruption in the educational setting and therefore warranted 
First Amendment protection). 
 33 See Joseph A. Tomain, Cyberspace Is Outside the Schoolhouse Gate: Offensive, Online Student 
Speech Receives First Amendment Protection, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 97, 98, 102–03 (2010–2011) (stat-
ing that the need for Supreme Court guidance is fast approaching). 
 34 See id. at 104 (arguing that cyberspace does not have a captive audience and therefore off-
campus online speech should not be penalized and that free speech helps develop a student’s identity); 
see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (establishing free 
speech rights for students). 
 35 See Tomain, supra note 33, at 105 (claiming that free speech rights should take priority over 
school discipline because of the importance of speech to developing a student’s identity); see also Lee 
Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 
395, 407–08 (2011) (arguing for blanket protection for student off-campus speech unless under the 
supervision of a faculty member so as to provide clarity and predictability for schools and students). 
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endorses a risk of substantial disruption standard. While schools await Court 
guidance, and after it is given, schools should forego new, limited Internet sur-
veillance companies in favor of a well-tested resource: skilled counselors. 
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF STUDENTS 
The First Amendment grants individuals the right to free speech, yet this 
right has limits, especially in the educational system.36 In 1969, the Supreme 
Court extended free speech to students in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District.37 Tinker’s oft-cited passage stands as a reminder 
for administrators, teachers, students and parents: “It can hardly be argued that 
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech 
or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”38 This broad right was tempered in 
1986 by Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser, wherein the Supreme 
Court stated that “the constitutional rights of students in public schools are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”39 
A. Student Free Speech Precedent: The Tinker Standard 
In Tinker, two high school students and one junior high school student 
wore black armbands to school as a visible protest to the then-ongoing hostili-
ties in Vietnam.40 The Supreme Court held that this action, though not audible 
speech, was a symbolic act falling within the protections of the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment.41 In doing so, the Court established the sub-
stantial disruption test: restrictions on free speech may be upheld only if they 
are “necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork 
or discipline . . . .”42 Consequently, students may express their opinions if done 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances.”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682, 686 (1986) (denying the same lati-
tude of free speech to children as adults). 
 37 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 38 See id. 
 39 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682, 685 (holding the punishment of a student for indecent speech at a 
school assembly did not violate his free speech rights as the speech was vulgar and offensive and was 
spoken to an audience that included minors who did not expect such lewdness); see also New Jersey 
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (Powell, J., concurring) (stressing “the special characteristics of elemen-
tary and secondary schools that make it unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional protec-
tions granted adults and juveniles in a non-school setting”); Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 
324, 331 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that “school officials retain some ‘authority . . . consistent with fun-
damental constitutional safeguards to prescribe and control conduct in the schools’” (quoting Tinker, 
393 U.S. at 507)). 
 40 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 41 Id. at 505, 511. 
 42 See id. at 511. 
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“without materially and substantially interfering” with school operations and 
without intruding on the rights of others.43 In the opinion, the Tinker Court ex-
plained that free speech is especially necessary in a school environment, as the 
classroom serves as a “marketplace of ideas” and educating children to be fu-
ture leaders requires them to engage in exchanges of ideas and a rich diversity 
of thought.44 
B. Courts Split on the Freedom Given to Students’ Internet Speech 
The basic truths articulated in Tinker have stood the test of time, even as 
technology has created new forums for speech.45 Tinker continues to serve as 
the basis for free speech issues under the First Amendment for students in ele-
mentary through high school, and is also frequently cited in postsecondary free 
speech cases.46 In the time since Tinker, while technology has evolved, free 
speech policy for students has floundered with a split at the circuit court level, 
despite a common application of the substantial disruption test.47 With increas-
                                                                                                                           
 43 Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). A simple synopsis of 
guiding case law is found in the Sixth Circuit case Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 563–64 (6th Cir. 
2008), which explained three principles: “(1) under Fraser, a school may categorically prohibit vul-
gar, lewd, indecent, or plainly offensive student speech, (2) under Hazelwood [Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier], a school has limited authority to censor school-sponsored student speech in a manner 
consistent with pedagogical concerns, and (3) the Tinker standard applies to all other student speech 
and allows regulation only when the school reasonably believes that the speech will substantially and 
materially interfere with schoolwork or discipline.” Id. (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. 683–85; Tinker, 393 
U.S. at 513; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)). 
 44 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
 45 See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011) (using Tinker as the 
basis for denial of Internet free speech protection to student); Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. 
Supp. 2d 791, 801 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (discussing Tinker at length as the basis for Internet free speech 
protection for student). 
 46 See, e.g., Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262, 266 (using Tinker to analyze student speech rights in a 
high school-sponsored newspaper); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207, 211 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (discussing Tinker while analyzing a student’s right to free speech on a MySpace page that 
he authored which mocked one of his high school teachers); Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 
671, 674, 680 (6th Cir. 2001) (using Tinker to analyze a college professor’s free speech rights); 
DePinto v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 514 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637 (D.N.J. 2007) (using Tinker to analyze 
right of fifth grade students to wear buttons protesting school’s uniform policy). 
 47 See, e.g., Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks Sch. Dist., 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700, 703 (W.D. Pa. 
2003); Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 801; Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 
1177, 1182 (E.D. Mo. 1998). In Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks School District, a student posted three 
messages on a message board regarding an upcoming volleyball game and was disciplined in school. 
247 F. Supp. 2d at 700. Although the text of the messages was not revealed, the true issue in the case 
was whether the school’s handbook regarding free speech was constitutionally overbroad and vague. 
Id. at 701. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania followed Tinker’s substan-
tial disruption standard, holding that the school’s handbook was too vague and consequentially could 
be interpreted to prohibit speech protected by the First Amendment in violation of Tinker. Id. at 703. 
Interestingly, the Flaherty court also attacked the school handbook for being geographically vague: 
the handbook failed “to geographically limit a school official’s authority to discipline expressions that 
occur on school premises or school related activities . . . .” See id. at 705. Instead, the handbook ex-
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ing student Internet use beginning in the 1990s, and no opinion from the Su-
preme Court addressing the issue of students’ Internet speech, lower courts 
have been forced to individually confront student Internet speech, including 
postings that do not originate at school but have secondary effects within the 
school.48 The resulting circuit split is based primarily on varying interpreta-
tions of the Court’s 1969 holding in Tinker, as applied to Internet conduct dec-
ades later.49 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio used the Tinker 
standard of substantial disruption when it granted free speech protection to a 
high school student’s Internet speech in Coy ex rel. Coy v. Board of Educa-
tion.50 On his home computer, the student created a website that included pro-
fanity and a “Losers” section with photos of three classmates and individual 
insults under each photo.51 The school board suspended the student, claiming 
that his access of the site at school violated its code of conduct.52 Yet the stu-
dent presented evidence that he was actually disciplined for the content of the 
site, rather than his viewing of the site at school.53 The court applied the Tinker 
substantial disruption test, finding insufficient evidence that the student’s acts 
affected the school’s ability to maintain student discipline, thus protecting the 
student’s speech.54 
Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in 
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District used the Tinker substantial disrup-
tion standard to find that a high school student needlessly suffered irreparable 
harm when the school disciplined him for his online speech.55 The speech in 
question was posted on a website created by the student at his home, through 
                                                                                                                           
tended school authority over “student conduct in school, during the time spent in travel to and from 
school, and all after school and evening activities, including detention,’ and ‘in all places where stu-
dents are within the jurisdiction of the Board . . . .” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The court held 
that this was unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 706. 
 48 See Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1177, 1179; Kravets, supra note 24. 
 49 See Kravets, supra note 24; Paul Easton, Comment, Splitting the Difference: Layshock and J.S. 
Chart a Separate Path on Student Speech Rights, 53 B.C.L. REV. E. SUPP. 17, 18 (2012), http://
bclawreview.org/files/2012/02/02_easton.pdf (discussing the analyses of student Internet speech by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and Third Circuit, and predicting more school-
friendly decisions from the Third Circuit than the Second Circuit). The Third Circuit’s decisions in 
Layshock and J.S. have been criticized as contradictory. See Tanya Roth, Third Circuit Issues Differ-
ing MySpace Student Speech Opinions, FINDLAW (Feb. 8, 2010, 12:45 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/
decided/2010/02/3rd-circuit-issues-differing-myspace-student-speech-opinions.html. 
 50 See Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 801. 
 51 Id. at 795. 
 52 Id. at 796. 
 53 Id. at 801. The court characterized the student’s viewing of the website as done in a way so as 
to draw as little attention to what he was viewing as possible, and this was accepted as proof that the 
actual viewing was not a problem, but rather the website’s content was the issue. Id. at 800. 
 54 See id. at 801. 
 55 Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1180–81. 
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which he criticized school administration and invited students to complain to 
the principal.56 After the administration learned of the website, the student was 
suspended from school for ten days, which, due to an absentee policy, resulted 
in his failing his junior year.57 The Beussink court found that the school acted 
outside of the Tinker standard of substantial disruption.58 “Speech within the 
school,” the court explained, “that substantially interferes with school disci-
pline may be limited. Individual student speech which is unpopular but does 
not substantially interfere with school discipline is entitled to protection.”59 
Absent guidance from the Supreme Court on Internet cases, U.S. Circuit 
Courts of Appeals patch together individual policies for students’ Internet 
use.60 In Wynar ex rel. Wynar v. Douglas County School District, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressed its frustration over the lack of 
guidance for student free speech on the Internet.61 The majority wrote: 
With the advent of the Internet and in the wake of school shootings 
at Columbine, Santee, Newtown and many others, school adminis-
trators face the daunting task of evaluating potential threats of vio-
lence and keeping their students safe without impinging on their 
constitutional rights. It is a feat like tightrope balancing, where an 
error in judgment can lead to a tragic result. Courts have long dealt 
with the tension between students’ First Amendment rights and “the 
special characteristics of the school environment.” . . . But the chal-
lenge for administrators is made all the more difficult because, out-
side of the official school environment, students are . . . communi-
cating electronically, sometimes about subjects that threaten the 
safety of the school environment. At the same time, school officials 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Id. at 1177. 
 57 Id. at 1179–80. 
 58 Id. at 1180–81. 
 59 Id. at 1182. 
 60 Compare S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 773, 777 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (overturning a preliminary injunction favoring students who were suspended as a result of a 
racist and sexually explicit blog about their high school, finding that the blog created a substantial 
disruption under Tinker and thus the school could be justified in punishing them), with J.S. ex rel. 
Snyder v. Blue Mountain. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding student’s off-campus 
MySpace postings did not create a substantial disruption and her punishment was unwarranted), and 
Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (finding student’s Facebook page 
created off-campus about her hatred for a teacher did not cause a sufficient disruption on-campus to 
justify her punishment or any restriction on her free speech). 
 61 See Wynar ex rel. Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 17266) (holding there was a risk of substantial disruption sufficient to 
justify curbing a student’s First Amendment rights when the speech involved was a student’s instant 
messages that threatened school shooting). 
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must take care not to overreact and to take into account the creative 
juices and often startling writings of the students.62 
The split amongst circuit and district courts over whether students’ Inter-
net postings could be the basis of school discipline has led to much policy dis-
cussion amongst these courts.63 In J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School 
District five of the eight judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit that heard this case stated in a concurrence that First Amendment rights 
should be extended to students engaging in off-campus speech in the same way 
that they are extended to all citizens in public.64 The concurring judges’ opin-
ion endorsed the idea that Tinker goes too far, and off-campus speech must be 
vigorously protected from school discipline.65 Other courts have cited this con-
currence as support for more liberalized free speech for high school students.66 
One such case, T.V. v. Smith Green Community School, involved two tenth grade 
girls who posted sexually explicit photos of themselves taken at a slumber party 
on Facebook, MySpace, and PhotoBucket.67 A parent brought printouts of the 
photos to the school to show school administrators, claiming that the photos 
caused divisiveness on the volleyball team.68 The school suspended the girls 
from extracurricular activities in accordance with its handbook.69 The Northern 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Id. (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266). 
 63 See Kowalski Certiorari Petition, supra note 24, at 3 (noting that “[t]he courts of appeals wide-
ly disagree about whether and when punishing that off-campus speech is constitutionally permissi-
ble”); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216 (favoring students’ rights to free speech in off-campus social media 
postings); Doninger v. Niehoff 527 F.3d 41, 49, 53 (2d Cir. 2008) (balancing a student’s rights with 
the importance of a school’s ability to punish students for substantial disruptions and ultimately find-
ing that a school could do so). 
 64 J.S., 650 F.3d at 936 (Smith, J., concurring). The concurrence stated that “the First Amendment 
protects students engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent it protects speech by citizens in 
the community at large.” Id. 
 65 See id. at 939. To demonstrate how extending Tinker to off-campus Internet speech would go 
too far, the Honorable D. Brooks Smith outlined in his concurrence the following scenario: 
 Suppose a high school student, while at home after school hours, were to write a 
blog entry defending gay marriage. Suppose further that several of the student’s class-
mates got wind of the entry, took issue with it, and caused a significant disturbance at 
school. While the school could clearly punish the students who acted disruptively, if 
Tinker were held to apply to off-campus speech, the school could also punish the stu-
dent whose blog entry brought about the disruption. That cannot be, nor is it, the law. 
Id. 
 66 See, e.g., Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069; T.V. ex rel. B.V v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch., 807 F. Supp. 
2d 767, 781 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 67 T.V. F. Supp. 2d, at 771–72. 
 68 Id. at 772. The cited divisiveness was that girls on the team formed groups that were either pro-
photo or anti-photo. See id. Another parent also made a complaint. Id. at 773. 
 69 Id. at 773–74. The handbook stated, “If you act in a manner in school or out of school that 
brings discredit or dishonor upon yourself or your school, you may be removed from extracurricular 
activities for all or part of the year.” Id. at 774. This punishment was later reduced to twenty-five 
percent of fall extracurricular activities, which meant that one student missed six volleyball games, 
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District of Illinois ruled that this punishment intruded on their First Amend-
ment rights, as the behavior was “non-disruptive” under the Tinker standard.70 
In contrast, in 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit pro-
vided meaningful deference to schools that choose to act in good faith when 
handling students’ online speech that relates to their school.71 In Kowalski v. 
Berkeley County Schools, the court wrote that “where such speech has a suffi-
cient nexus with the school, the Constitution is not written to hinder school 
administrators’ good faith efforts to address the problem.”72 In Kowalski, high 
school senior Kara Kowalski created a MySpace discussion board from her 
home computer, the goal of which was to ridicule a fellow student.73 The girl 
whom the page targeted filed a harassment complaint with the high school and 
left school for the day, stating that she felt “uncomfortable about sitting in 
class with students who had posted [online] comments about her . . . .”74 As a 
result of the complaint, Kowalski’s high school suspended her for five days 
from school and for ninety days from school social activities.75 Kowalski filed 
suit against the school, stating that the punishment made her suffer social isola-
tion, depression, and poor treatment from teachers.76 In addition to other ar-
guments, Kowalski claimed that she had a First Amendment right to speech 
because her MySpace posting was not created during an activity related to the 
                                                                                                                           
while the other missed five volleyball games and one choir performance. Id. The case did not state 
whether the handbook specifically addressed social media at all. See id. 
 70 See id. at 780, 781. The court was candid about the implications of free speech rights in the 
case, calling the girls’ photos “juvenile and silly.” See id. at 775. The opinion begins with, “Not much 
good takes place at slumber parties for high school kids, and this case proves the point.” Id. at 771. 
Even more telling is the judge’s loyalty to the law despite his personal opinions: 
 Let’s be honest about it: the speech in this case doesn’t exactly call to mind high-
minded civic discourse about current events. And one could reasonably question the 
wisdom of making a federal case out of a 6-game suspension from a high school vol-
leyball schedule. But for better or worse, that’s what this case is about and it is now ripe 
for disposition. 
See id. 
 71 See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 577. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 567. The board topic was entitled, “S.A.S.H.,” which Kowalski claims stood for “Stu-
dents Against Sluts Herpes,” but a classmate explained was really for “Students Against Shay’s Her-
pes,” mocking another high school student, Shay, the main subject of the message board. Id. The mes-
sage board ultimately hosted two dozen other comments, including edited photos of Shay. Id. Kow-
alski did not just create the page, but was active on it, prompting a student to post the message, 
“you’re so awesome kara . . . i never thought u would mastermind a group that hates [someone] tho, 
lol [laugh out loud].” See id. at 568. 
 74 Id. at 568. 
 75 Id. at 569. 
 76 Id. at 569, 570. 
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school, but rather was “private out-of-school speech.”77 The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s summary judgment against Kowalski, agreeing that 
her site was “created for the purpose of inviting others to indulge in disruptive 
and hateful conduct,” which resulted in an “in-school disruption.”78 The Fourth 
Circuit qualified what constituted a substantial disruption in this case, stating 
that Kowalski used the page “to orchestrate a targeted attack on a classmate, 
and did so in a manner that was sufficiently connected to the school environ-
ment . . . ,” which thus empowered the school to discipline her because her 
speech materially and substantially interfered with the school’s discipline and 
collided with the rights of others.79 
The Kowalski court recognized that the Supreme Court had yet to rule on 
the extent of First Amendment rights as applied to off-campus Internet speech, 
so it looked instead to the decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit in Lowery v. Euverard, which held that schools “have an affirma-
tive duty to not only ameliorate the harmful effects of disruptions, but to pre-
vent them from happening in the first place.”80 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Id. at 567. Kowalski also argued that she was denied due process, was subjected to cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and had her Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal 
protection violated. Id. at 570. 
 78 Id. at 567. 
 79 Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 573–74. 
Other cases under Tinker focus instead on safety concerns. See, e.g., Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1065. In 
Wynar, a tenth grade student discussed guns and a high school shooting on his MySpace page and 
within instant messages to his friends. Id. at 1064–66. The messages were specific, including names of 
potential victims, types of weapons to use, a date, and disappointment that he could not kill enough 
people to satisfy himself. See id. at 1065–66. The Ninth Circuit applied the Tinker test in analyzing 
and upholding the school’s response of a ninety-day expulsion. See id. at 1066, 1068–69. Looking to 
its “sister circuits” to determine whether some preliminary test must be applied before analyzing off-
campus speech under Tinker, the court explained that the Second Circuit had not yet decided whether 
it must be shown that it was “‘reasonably foreseeable that [the speech] would reach the school proper-
ty . . .’ [b]ut [that] at least where it is reasonably foreseeable that off-campus speech meeting the Tink-
er test will wind up at school, the Second Circuit has permitted schools to impose discipline based on 
the speech.” Id. at 1068–69 (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007), and 
citing Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48). The court found that the student’s behavior was “alarming,” “explo-
sive,” and so specific that it presented “a real risk of significant disruption.” Id. at 1065, 1070. 
 80 See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572 (quoting Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 
2007)) (emphasis added). The duty of educators to protect students is well-established. See, e.g., Doe 
Parents No. 1 ex rel. Doe v. State Dep’t of Educ., 58 P.3d 545, 582 (Haw. 2002), (stating that the 
Hawaii Department of Education owed middle school children reasonable care to ensure that students 
are educated in a safe environment, free of any unreasonable risks of harm); Mullins v. Pine Manor 
Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Mass. 1983) (articulating a college’s duty to its students). Mullins v. Pine 
Manor College further explained that 
[t]he duty of due care owed the [student] plaintiff by the [college] defendants in the pre-
sent case can be grounded on either of two well established principles of law. First, we 
have said that a duty finds its source in existing social values and customs. . . . The duty 
of care in this case can be grounded in another theory. It is an established principle that 
a duty voluntarily assumed must be performed with due care. 
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C. An Alternative Interpretation: The “True Threat” Standard 
Although various circuit and district courts have almost exclusively cho-
sen to analyze student online speech using Tinker, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit acknowledged the use of the “true threat” standard as an 
additional, complementary interpretation in 2011.81 The true threat standard is 
often used in cases involving threats of violence, as it originated in the context 
of a vague threat against former President Johnson.82 However, the true threat 
standard may apply to numerous circumstances and environments, making it 
much broader than the substantial disruption test that applies strictly to 
schools.83 Indeed, Supreme Court guidance on what constitutes a true threat 
makes the standard applicable to numerous situations; true threats “encompass 
those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expres-
sion of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular” person 
or group, regardless of whether the speaker intends to carry out that threat.84 
In D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Public School District No. 60, the 
Eighth Circuit analyzed a student’s free speech claim under both the substan-
tial disruption and true threat standard in order to conclude that a school’s dis-
cipline over his speech was warranted.85 The case involved a tenth grade stu-
dent, D.J.M., who sent instant messages to his friend that discussed his desire 
                                                                                                                           
Id. at 335–36 (internal quotes omitted). 
 81 See D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 764 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 82 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 705–06 (1969). The true threat concept came from a 
1917 federal statute that prohibits citizens from making threats against a president. See id. at 705; see 
also 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1917). Although the statute only uses the word “threat,” without the word 
“true,” the Watts court added “true” in order to analyze what it called the “willfulness” of the speak-
er’s threat, as opposed to political hyperbole. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 707; see also 18 U.S.C § 871(a). 
The 1917 statute penalizes anyone who “knowingly and willfully” creates a writing “containing any 
threat” to kill, kidnap, or harm the president, president-elect, or any other officer, or “knowingly and 
willfully otherwise makes any such threat” against these individuals. 18 U.S.C. § 871(a). 
 83 See Watts, 394 U.S. at 707. The threat that the Watts court analyzed was the credibility of a 
threat to the president by an angry citizen at a rally near the Washington Monument who was dis-
pleased about being drafted. See id. at 706. There, the Supreme Court held that the citizen’s speech 
was “a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition . . . ,” and that it must be 
examined in context, allowing for the standard to be applied broadly to any speech across environ-
ments. See id. at 708. In contrast, Tinker specifically was decided in the context of schools and has not 
been extended to other circumstances. See 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
 84 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 
U.S. 377, 388); see also Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(explaining that Watts did not create a “particular definition or description of a true threat that distin-
guishes an unprotected threat from protected speech,” which forces lower courts to make subjective 
determinations about when a school may prevent a substantial disruption through fear of a threat). 
Pulaski used a reasonable recipient test for its true threat analysis. See id. at 623; see also United 
States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 
925 (8th Cir. 1996) (employing a reasonable recipient test for determination of a true threat)). 
 85 See D.J.M., 647 F.3d at 765, 766. 
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to shoot students in his high school.86 D.J.M. named students that he wanted to 
shoot, stated whom he would shoot first, and named the weapon that he would 
use.87 The recipient of these messages reported him and, ultimately, D.J.M. 
was taken into police custody and evaluated for one week at a psychiatric hos-
pital.88 After his release, school administration suspended D.J.M., at first for 
ten days and then for the rest of the semester.89 Administrators justified the 
suspension by citing the significant disruption and fear that D.J.M.’s actions 
caused within the school community.90 D.J.M.’s parents appealed the suspen-
sion.91 
The Eighth Circuit began its interpretation by noting the lack of Supreme 
Court guidance on the topic.92 In evaluating D.J.M.’s claim, the Eighth Circuit 
used Tinker to discuss the substantial disruption that the student’s statements 
caused within the school.93 But before this lengthy analysis, the court touched 
on the true threat standard, naming it as a consideration in addition to the sub-
stantial disruption test.94 The Eighth Circuit explained that it was not required 
to determine whether D.J.M. actually intended to carry out his threat; the 
school had reason to be alarmed and it acted appropriately by involving the 
police.95 Accordingly, his suspension was upheld and the court found that his 
actions satisfied both the substantial disruption and true threat test.96 
                                                                                                                           
 86 See id. at 757–58. 
 87 Id. at 758. 
 88 Id. at 758–59. 
 89 Id. at 759. 
 90 Id. Administrators explained that they extended D.J.M.’s suspension for the rest of the year 
because his instant messages had a “disruptive impact on the school.” Id. Parents called the principal, 
asking what action he would take and whether their children were on D.J.M.’s hit list. Id. Consequent-
ly, the principal increased campus security by assigning staff to monitor entrances and public areas, 
limiting access to the school, and communicating what measures were taken to parents. Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See id. at 761. The Eighth Circuit stated that in none of the Supreme Court cases on student 
speech were there any situations where school discipline responded to threats of violence or conduct 
outside of school. See id. Instead, lower courts have faced these decisions, with various approaches to 
resolve them. See id. 
 93 See id. at 765. 
 94 See id. at 764. The two cases that the Eighth Circuit cited that used true threat as their primary 
test involved a letter and a drawing, respectively, not online conduct. See id. at 761–62; see also Por-
ter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 620 (5th Cir. 2004) (involving a student’s violent 
sketch and using both the substantial disruption and true threat standards); Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 621, 
625 (involving a threatening letter written by a student and using the true threat standard alone). 
 95 See D.J.M., 647 F.3d at 764. 
 96 See id. At the time of that opinion, the Eighth Circuit was unable to cite to any cases involving 
student free speech online that used solely the true threat standard without discussion of the substan-
tial disruption test. See id. 
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II. CURRENT SCHOOL SURVEILLANCE EFFORTS 
Given that the Supreme Court has not ruled on off-campus Internet 
speech, the legality of student Internet surveillance carried out by schools re-
mains uncertain.97 Today’s efforts at student Internet surveillance are mostly 
old-fashioned, relying on students or parents as whistleblowers who bring 
alarming circumstances to the school administration’s attention.98 These cir-
cumstances arise on websites such as Facebook, MySpace, and Tumblr, where 
students who have accounts may choose to post information publicly or “pri-
vately,” to those to whom they have granted page access.99 
The traditional reliance on whistleblowers, however, may not be enough 
in a world where teenage Internet interactions are so prevalent.100 In the wake 
of widely publicized tragedies such as student suicides, some schools are tak-
ing preventative steps by employing third-party companies to monitor public 
posts by students made both on and off school grounds.101 An October 2013 
                                                                                                                           
 97 See Sengupta, supra note 23; Supreme Court Declines to Hear Student Internet Speech Cases, 
NAT’L SCH. BOARDS ASS’N, (Jan. 19, 2012), http://legalclips.nsba.org/2012/01/19/breaking-news-
supreme-court-denies-cert-in-student-internet-speech-cases/. Having standards for student free speech 
overall creates some predictability, but is ultimately insufficient for the realities of an Internet society. 
See id. 
 98 Sengupta, supra note 23. 
 99 Privacy Policy, GEO LISTENING (Oct. 10, 2013), http://geolistening.com/privacy-policy/. Face-
book and MySpace are social networking sites organized on the premise of creating networks of 
“friends,” with whom users can share biographical information, photos, preferences, videos, and 
thoughts. See Daniel Nations, Facebook Profile, ABOUT.COM, http://webtrends.about.com/od/profiles/
fr/facebook-profile-what-is-facebook.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2014); Linda Roeder, What Is 
MySpace?, ABOUT.COM, http://personalweb.about.com/od/myspacecom/a/whatismyspace.htm (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2014). Tumblr is more freeform and may be called “microblogging,” where users 
create websites that can host blog posts, photographs, and other media, and individuals can “follow” 
another’s Tumblr. Doug Aamoth, What is Tumblr?, TIME MAG., (May 19, 2013), 
http://techland.time.com/2013/05/19/what-is-tumblr/. 
 100 See Sengupta, supra note 23. 
 101 See id. Although this Note does not attempt to tackle the complicated and timely topic of 
cyberbullying, there are First Amendment implications for the speakers, namely, the cyberbullies. See, 
e.g., Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 801 (N.D. Ohio 2002). The examples of 
extreme cyberbullying and First Amendment rights are, unfortunately, plentiful. See Kowalski v. 
Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011) (involving a student-created webpage target-
ing another student, called “Students Against Shay’s Herpes”); Ahrens, supra note 30, at 1694; 
Schneider & Kay, supra note 5. Technology also came into the spotlight in the “Steubenville Rape 
Case” of 2012, where teenagers, via cellphone, threatened a girl who was raped against going to au-
thorities. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Ohio Teenagers Guilty in Rape That Social Media Brought to 
Light, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2013, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/us/
teenagers-found-guilty-in-rape-in-steubenville-ohio.html. This case generated a national media frenzy 
when an intoxicated sixteen-year-old was raped in Ohio and photos and a video of the rape were cir-
culated over the Internet. See id. The “Steubenville Rape Case,” as it became known, involved primar-
ily text messages and a publicly available YouTube video. Id. Conviction of the Steubenville teenag-
ers involved in the rape demonstrates the gravity of the consequences that a social media posting 
could create. See Alexandra Kushner, The Need for Sexting Law Reform: Appropriate Punishments 
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New York Times article reported that although surveillance of students’ off-
campus Internet speech still relies mostly on students reporting their peers’ 
behavior, some schools are taking proactive steps to ensure the safety of their 
students through professional surveillance companies that monitor students’ 
public Internet posts.102 
Geo Listening and CompuGuardian are two companies that offer services 
for schools to monitor students’ Internet speech, though they use different ap-
proaches.103 CompuGuardian monitors student activity on school-owned 
hardware, regardless of where the activity occurs, while Geo Listening looks at 
publicly-available posts, posted from anywhere, using any hardware.104 Com-
puGuardian welcomes its website visitors with a statistic from the Chicago Sun 
Times: two out of three “violent school acts start with digital aggression.”105 
Geo Listening’s website greets visitors with a similarly bold assertion: “Dis-
rupt bullying before it’s too late.”106 
Geo Listening’s website explains that its goal is to shift the school’s inter-
vention from where it is presently, relying on student reporting, to a stage clos-
er to the beginning of cyberbullying, before harm is severe.107 Geo Listening 
                                                                                                                           
for Teenage Behaviors, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 281 (2013) (giving a thorough analysis of 
the sexting phenomenon and advocating for teenage responsibility and education around actions). 
 102 See Sengupta, supra note 23. In this article, the executive director of the American Associa-
tion of School Administrators, Daniel Domenech, called the policy of preventative surveillance of 
students’ online speech “cumbersome and confusing.” Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Compare Features, COMPUGUARDIAN, http://www.compuguardian.com/category/features (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2015) (explaining the company’s services as including live monitoring of student hard-
ware use, content blocking, remote control, and activity logs), with FAQs, GEO LISTENING, http://
geolistening.com/faq/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015) (explaining that the company does not bypass security 
for student online activity, but rather gathers information “from public posts on social networks”) [here-
inafter FAQs]. CompuGuardian’s services are not limited to publicly available information; it relies on 
information obtained from the school owned equipment, such as keystroke tracking, screenshots, and 
instant message conversations. See COMPUGUARDIAN, http://www.compuguardian.com/ (saved on Nov. 
8, 2013) (accessed by searching for http://www.compuguardian.com/ in the Internet Archive Index) 
[hereinafter COMPUGUARDIAN Archive]. The services appear to be marketed to schools for services 
similar to Geo Listening with two main exceptions: (1) CompuGuardian explicitly names pornography as 
an aim for its surveillance, and (2) CompuGuardian’s services appear to target schools for help in the 
surveillance of school district-owned hardware, so that students’ activity may easily be tracked. See id. 
Much to the dismay of reporters, Geo Listening and CompuGuardian did not reveal how their services 
truly operate. See Cyrus Farivar, California School District Hires Online Monitoring Firm to Watch 
13,000 Students, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 16, 2013, 6:20 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/
california-school-district-hires-online-monitoring-firm-to-watch-13000-students/. 
 105 See COMPUGUARDIAN Archive, supra note 104 (citing Frank Main, Gangs Using Social Me-
dia to Spread Violence, CHI. SUN TIMES, Feb. 28. 2012, http://www.suntimes.com/news/metro/
10256178-418/cyber-tagging-now-the-gang-graffiti-of-the-internet.html (Former Chicago Police Su-
perintendent Jody Weis “estimated two-thirds of school-related violence is spawned on social-media 
sites.”)). 
 106 See GEO LISTENING, http://www.geolistening.com/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
 107 Schools, GEO LISTENING, http://geolistening.com/schools/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
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does not monitor any private pages, text messages, emails, phone calls, 
voicemails or other private content, but instead, it 
collects, processes, analyzes and reports only publicly available data 
that aligns with school district procedures and board policies related 
to student conduct and safety. [Its] Monitoring Service takes into ac-
count frequency and severity of a student’s posts that include indica-
tors relating to the school conduct and safety categories, including 
bullying, cyberbullying, hate and shaming activities, depression, 
harm and self harm [sic], self hate [sic] and suicide, crime, vandal-
ism, substance abuse and truancy.108 
Geo Listening explains that to opt out of its surveillance, a student simply 
should not post publicly on the sites that it presently monitors, including Twit-
ter, Facebook, Instagram, Picasa, Vine, Flickr, Ask.fm, YouTube, and Google+, 
because the company does not bypass any user privacy settings.109 School ad-
ministrators receive daily reports of flagged comments, regardless of where the 
posts were created, and are the ones to decide whether to act.110 
Geo Listening’s services emphasize that students’ posts are captured by 
the service in the same way that any member of the public, including adminis-
trators, could have found the content on his own.111 This type of surveillance 
does not tackle the issue of private postings, which may include peer-to-peer 
messaging such as instant messages over smartphone and tablet applica-
tions.112 But for now, this is how some schools have chosen to tackle one part 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Privacy Policy, supra note 99. 
 109 Id. The sites listed by Geo Listening are all part of a broad classification of social media sites, 
where users are able to post comments to their own and others’ accounts. See generally Nick Bilton, 
Newest Battle Is in Messaging, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2014, at B6 (explaining a plethora of messaging 
applications and “messaging app overload”). 
 110 Glendale School District Monitoring Students’ Social Media with Geo Listening, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 16, 2013, 6:43 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/16/glendale-schools-social-
media_n_3935075.html. The creator of Geo Listening explained that the kinds of posts that get 
flagged are those that “deal with . . . despair,” though “[h]e wouldn’t share an example of the types of 
reports that would go to school officials . . . .” See Farivar, supra note 104. 
 111 See Sengupta, supra note 23. 
 112 See id. Students have a significant number of smartphone and tablet applications, or “apps,” to 
choose from when pursuing social messaging. See Sarah Perez, Overrun with Messaging Apps, 
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 6, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/12/06/overrun-with-messaging-apps. In 
November 2013, analysts predicted that the number of messages sent on social messaging apps will 
grow from 27.5 trillion in 2013 to 71.5 trillion in 2014. Id. Before her suicide, Rebecca Ann Sedwick 
changed her name on Kik Messenger, a peer-to-peer messaging app, to “That Dead Girl.” Alvarez, 
supra note 14. Kik was one of the apps through which she had been bullied. See Bazelon, supra note 
2. Other apps made specifically for messaging include WhatsApp, Viber, ask.fm, MessageMe, Wut, 
and Popcorn. Bilton, supra note 109. Recognizing the growing market of messaging and its inability 
to compete, Facebook purchased WhatsApp for $19 billion in February 2014. See Sarah Frier, Face-
book to Buy Messaging App WhatsApp for $19 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 20, 2014, 4:54 PM), http://
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of students’ disruptive speech that may threaten the safety of their schools.113 
Glendale Unified School District in Glendale, California, is one of the schools 
making this effort; in 2012, it signed a $40,500 contract with Geo Listening to 
monitor high school students’ public posts on certain social media sites, in part 
to respond to a string of teenage suicides in the district.114 
III. BENEFITS OF AND PROBLEMS WITH SURVEILLANCE 
As some schools choose to employ third-party companies to monitor stu-
dents’ Internet conduct, the benefits and drawbacks of these services must be 
identified.115 Ultimately, as a result of the lack of Supreme Court guidance and 
the ubiquitous nature of Internet technology, it is unclear whether schools may 
legally surveil students’ Internet posts in order to protect the school population 
from a substantial disruption to its educational goals.116 Although school sur-
veillance companies offer schools a way to aggregate public online action by 
students, their services are expensive, have yet to be proven effective, and 
most importantly, such surveillance raises real constitutional concerns about 
limiting student speech.117 
A. Importance of Student Free Speech and Student Safety 
Students’ free speech is of great importance to not just students them-
selves, but also to educators and the parents who entrust schools with their 
children’s development; concerned parties want to encourage free thinking, 
expose children to multiple perspectives and diversity of thought, and promote 
expression of thought, autonomy, and tolerance.118 Schools are heralded as ex-
                                                                                                                           
www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-19/facebook-to-buy-mobile-messaging-app-whatsapp-for-16-
billion.html. 
 113 See Glendale School District Monitoring Students’ Social Media with Geo Listening, supra 
note 110. 
 114 See Sengupta, supra note 23; Glendale School District Monitoring Students’ Social Media 
with Geo Listening, supra note 110. Online surveillance companies have grown substantially in the 
collegiate athletic market as well, due in part to NCAA guidance that has recommended, though not 
mandated, monitoring of student-athlete social media postings. See University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill Public Infractions Report, NCAA 1, 11 (Mar. 12, 2012), http://chronicle.com/blogs/
ticker/files/2012/03/UNC.pdf. In response to this growing trend, several bills were proposed to make 
it more difficult for colleges to monitor student-athletes online. See Pete Thamel, Tracking Twitter, 
Raising Red Flags, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2012, at D1. 
 115 See Sengupta, supra note 23. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See id. 
 118 See Murray Dry, The Mixed Character of Free Speech and Its Implication for Public Schools 
in America, 32 VT. B.J., 32, 35 (2006) (discussing free speech within schools). Murray Dry explains 
that teachers face two “dangers”: manipulating students to accept certain opinions rather than research 
and form their own, and encouraging the equality of ideas, which could validate ethically irresponsible 
views. See id. at 36. Student free speech, he explains, is crucial in schools despite this second danger: 
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perimental zones where students learn lessons that cannot be taught at home.119 
A student must be able to express himself in a controlled learning environment 
such as a school, in part to test the boundaries of what is acceptable in greater 
society.120 But students whose out-of-school Internet speech affects their peers’ 
ability to learn at school create a great disadvantage for their peers, and Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District establishes that free 
speech concerns must be tempered when student speech creates a substantial 
disruption.121 
Internet speech, however, also implicates some of a school’s core func-
tions, including the promotion of social utility, civility, and respect for oth-
ers.122 It is precisely for these reasons that the Supreme Court has granted 
schools the ability to discipline students if their free speech is too disruptive.123 
But after the Supreme Court deemed any “exclusion from the educational pro-
cess for more than a trivial period . . . a serious event in the life of the suspend-
ed child . . .” lower courts have made significant efforts to ensure that students 
are not suspended or otherwise removed from school unless the need is 
great.124 Therefore the importance of keeping students in school must be bal-
anced with the need to ensure a safe environment for all students and grant 
schools some autonomy in the process.125 School officials must be able to 
make snap decisions: they can never be prepared for all of the challenges that a 
diverse student body can bring.126 Preventatively surveying social media and 
                                                                                                                           
“If the most basic part of free speech is the development of the mind, it is an essential part of educa-
tion.” Id. at 35. 
 119 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (upholding a school’s discipli-
nary action, stating that, as “it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit 
the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse,” and that “[t]he schools, as instruments of 
the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a 
school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct”). 
 120 See id.; see also Dry, supra note 118, at 38. 
 121 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
 122 See Mark W. Cordes, Making Sense of High School Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 17 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 660 (2009) (discussing the decision in Morse v. Frederick and stating that 
“[s]chools don’t exist to facilitate free speech, but rather to educate students, and students’ free speech 
interests must be tailored to a school’s unique environment”). 
 123 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 
506) (outlining the tension between First Amendment rights and the “special characteristics of the 
school environment,” and upholding a school’s right to discipline its students). 
 124 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577, 579–80 (1975) (discussing the importance of 
caution in any decisions to suspend a student from school, claiming, “the risk of error is not at all 
trivial, and it should be guarded against if that may be done without prohibitive cost or interference 
with the educational process”); Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 826 (7th Cir. 1998) (recognizing 
the severe harm that a one-year expulsion would create in a case involving a newspaper created off-
campus but distributed on-campus by a student). 
 125 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 580. 
 126 See id. (noting that, in a school, “[e]vents calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and 
sometimes require immediate, effective action”); see also Morse, 551 U.S. at 409–10; New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) (explaining that maintaining classroom order in recent years has 
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enforcing punishments for inappropriate speech could increase safety within 
schools and ideally would lessen the number of snap decisions that teachers 
must make by having a third-party forecast disruptions before they bubble over 
into the school.127 
Whether prevention of a substantial disruption is compelling enough to 
warrant Internet surveillance is open to conjecture.128 In Kowalski v. Berkeley 
County Schools, the Fourth Circuit named school officials as “trustees of the 
student body’s well-being.”129 If taken to the extreme, this could intrude on a 
parent’s ability to raise his child as he deems fit, a fundamental right guaran-
teed by the Supreme Court.130 The Kowalski court, however, may be outdated 
in its view.131 Although schools once felt responsibility for the moral formation 
of students under the theory of in loco parentis, educational theorists and 
courts have noted a shift in that mindset; today, schools emphasize practical 
education over morality and courts are willing to impose liability on 
schools.132 This shift originated in the late 1960s, as the Civil Rights move-
                                                                                                                           
become more challenging due to social issues such as drug use and violent crime). In Morse, a student 
was suspended after he refused to take down a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at a school 
event. Id. at 397. The Court found that the principal’s decision to suspend him and remove the banner 
did not violate the First Amendment, as a principal must be able to make a snapshot decision in a 
critical moment. Id. at 409–10. The Morse Court recognized that “[s]chool principals have a difficult 
job, and a vitally important one.” Id. at 409. When the student who unveiled the banner did so “sud-
denly and unexpectedly,” the principal had to decide instantly whether to act. Id. at 410. “It was rea-
sonable for her to conclude that the banner promoted illegal drug use—in violation of established 
school policy—and that failing to act would send a powerful message” about the school’s seriousness 
regarding drug use. Id. The Court explained that the First Amendment does not require that schools 
tolerate student expression that contributes to the danger of making light of illicit drug use. Id. 
 127 See Sengupta, supra note 23. 
 128 See id. 
 129 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 130 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 205 (1972) (upholding the rights of members of the 
Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church to educate their children 
only to the age of sixteen in accordance with the religion and lifestyle that they chose for their chil-
dren, contrary to Wisconsin’s requirement of education through high school). 
 131 Compare T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336 (explaining that immunity for high schools from scrutiny 
because of in loco parentis is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and rejecting in loco paren-
tis because it does not fit into reality), and Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1156 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(stating that “the in loco parentis doctrine is no longer recognized as the source of school officials’ 
general authority over pupils” in relation to a high school field trip), with R.C.M. v. State of Tex., 660 
S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex. App. 1983) (stating that the Texas Appellate court is bound by in loco parentis 
in relation to a situation at a high school), and Gott v. Berea Coll., 161 S.W. 204, 206 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1913) (explaining that college authorities stand in loco parentis to the physical, mental, and moral 
welfare of students and can thus make any rule or regulation for the betterment of those students that a 
parent could make for the same purpose). 
 132 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336 (stating that in loco parentis is “in tension with contemporary 
reality and the teachings of [the] Court”); Susan Stuart, In Loco Parentis in the Public Schools: 
Abused, Confused, and in Need of Change, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 969, 970 (2010) (discussing the history 
and evolution of in loco parentis). In loco parentis is frequently discussed in reference to higher edu-
cation regarding liability, but also exists in elementary, middle, and high schools. See, e.g., T.L.O., 
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ment created tension between students and their schools, and courts responded 
by formally recognizing students’ rights over their former trustee—the 
school.133 If a court sees a school as acting in loco parentis and as a trustee of 
the student body, that school must be able to act on the conduct outside of 
school that causes a substantial interference within the educational process.134 
B. Potential Benefits of Surveillance 
Professional surveillance is a technology-forward response to a technolo-
gy-based problem.135 Through the use of surveillance, schools attempt to show 
a conscious effort to educate the whole student by encouraging responsible 
behavior outside of the school alongside similar behavior that is required with-
in it.136 By ensuring that students’ Internet usage does not substantially inter-
fere with their peers’ learning, schools encourage the development of their stu-
dents, who may worry less about Internet threats and more about their educa-
tion.137 Many courts have held that an actual substantial disruption to the edu-
cational environment is not required; rather, the risk of a substantial disruption 
may be sufficient to justify schools curbing or punishing student online 
speech.138 Ideally, use of Internet surveillance intercepts troubling messages 
                                                                                                                           
469 U.S. at 336 (involving high school freshman and search and seizure issues); R.C.M., 660 S.W.2d 
at 554 (involving discipline for high school student who disobeyed test taking procedures). 
 133 See, e.g., Goss, 419 U.S. at 581 (granting students the rights to due process for high school 
suspensions requiring notice of charges and a prior hearing); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 
F.2d 150, 155 (1961) (requiring due process of the law for student expulsion that resulted from Civil 
Rights activism). 
 134 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654, 655 (1995) (establishing in loco parentis 
between both public and private schools and their minor students). In Vernonia School District 47J v. 
Acton, the Supreme Court qualified a school’s duty to its students, noting that it did not, “of course, 
suggest that public schools as a general matter have such a degree of control over children as to give 
rise to a constitutional ‘duty to protect’ . . . .” (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty Dep’t Soc. 
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)).  
 135 See Sengupta, supra note 23 (discussing schools’ justifications for using online surveillance of 
students). 
 136 See Editorial, Cyber-Nosey Schools, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, at A12 (noting that monitor-
ing students online could cause students to be more cautious about Internet posts). 
 137 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
 138 See Wynar ex rel. Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(finding in favor of a school when it took action against a student for threatening, off-campus instant 
messages, justifying the actions because of a risk of a substantial disruption); D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. 
Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d at 764, 765 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that it was reasonably 
foreseeable that a student’s instant messages would pose a risk of a substantial disruption and, accord-
ingly, the school was justified in taking action against him); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 
39–40 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding against a student who sued on the basis of his First Amendment rights, 
reasoning that the risk of substantial disruption that his AOL Instant Messenger icon posed was signif-
icant enough to warrant school action). Each of these cases involved threats of violence. See Wynar, 
728 F.3d at 1064–65 (violence involved MySpace posts and instant messages detailing a desire to kill 
classmates); D.J.M., 647 F.3d at 758 (violence was instant messages detailing school shooting desire); 
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36 (involving AOL Instant Messenger buddy icon, which was an image of a 
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before they become an issue, legally justified by their risk of substantial dis-
ruption.139 
One benefit of Internet surveillance is that it is conducted by profession-
als who are third-parties to the schools and their communities.140 This allows 
the review of students’ public posts by an unbiased but trained professional 
who is unrelated to the school.141 This individual therefore cannot judge stu-
dents, and students’ relationships to a school employee will not suffer.142 In-
stead, the surveillance professional may look for key signs of troubling behav-
ior, such as threats made by one student to another or signs of bullying or self-
hate.143 Third-party surveillance saves students from the embarrassment asso-
ciated with teachers or parents investigating their online lives.144 
Proponents argue that using a professional surveillance company mini-
mizes the intrusion on student free speech rights in several ways.145 First, pro-
fessional surveillance does not bypass any security features if a student uses 
privacy controls on his account.146 Surveillance companies simply read public-
ly available content, just as a peer would.147 The advantage of using a compa-
ny, however, is that a trained professional may make an educated judgment 
call, as opposed to the current reliance on young, untrained students, who may 
either take their classmates too seriously or not seriously enough.148 Secondly, 
                                                                                                                           
teacher being shot). The Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all rendered decisions that use 
a risk of substantial disruption standard for evaluating restrictions on student online speech. See 
Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1065; D.J.M., 647 F.3d at 765; Lowery ex rel. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 
592 (6th Cir. 2007); Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40. In Lowery ex rel. Lowery v. Euverard, the Sixth 
Circuit held that Tinker does not require a certainty of substantial disruption. 497 F.3d at 592. Instead, 
the court held that if a substantial disruption is forecasted that materially interferes with school activi-
ties, then school officials would be justified in restricting student speech. See id. 
 139 See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1064; Schools, supra 107. 
 140 Cyber Bullying, Other Serious School Threats Addressed by Geo Listening’s Social Network 
Monitoring Services, PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/
cyber-bullying-other-serious-school-threats-addressed-by-geo-listenings-social-network-monitoring-
services-222152961.html (highlighting one surveillance company’s expertise in social networks, chil-
dren’s privacy, and privacy requirements in education). 
 141 See id. 
 142 See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 569 (relaying a student’s argument that her online actions were 
judged by her teachers as a result of their publicity). 
 143 See Glendale’s Cyber-Nosey Schools, supra note 136. 
 144 See Kowalski, 622 F.3d at 569. 
 145 VP, Comment to Sengupta, supra note 23, Oct. 30, 2013, 8:28 AM (emphasizing the public 
nature of posts contributing to surveillance’s legality); Thom J., Comment to Sengupta, supra note 23, 
Oct. 29, 2013, 8:12 PM (explaining the distinction between privacy and speech and the lack of privacy 
afforded when someone chooses to post publicly). 
 146 Privacy Policy, supra note 99. 
 147 See Stephan Ceasar, Glendale District Says Social Media Monitoring Is for Student Safety, 
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/14/local/la-me-glendale-social-
media-20130915 (explaining surveillance proponents’ viewpoint that public posts are no different 
from speaking in front of a teacher). 
 148 See Sengupta, supra note 23. 
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the technology could be one tool in a school’s comprehensive approach to de-
creasing cyberbullying, albeit, as a concerned parent of a Glendale School Dis-
trict student explained, a very small piece in that tool kit.149 
Finally, surveillance may be effective in curtailing specific types of dis-
ruptive online speech.150 Sexual violence and language are one area in which 
schools have intervened when a student’s Internet actions create a substantial 
disruption; third-party Internet surveillance could target these areas.151 In 2013, 
a Facebook group popular at Boston College, “Boston College Confessions” 
made national headlines when a student “confessed” to the rape of three fe-
male students on the college campus via the group.152 The post, publicly avail-
able and made on the student’s own time, was purportedly authored by an un-
dergraduate student who came forward and claimed that his posting was a 
joke.153 His act undeniably affected the campus community, dominating Bos-
ton College’s attention.154 It was reported that the student was referred for dis-
cipline, though to what degree is unclear.155 This accountability was champi-
oned by the greater community.156 Because the student’s posting was public, it 
falls into the category of posts that an online surveillance company would tar-
get, and could have been caught without relying on the bravery of whistle-
blowers.157 
Another area that surveillance would target is public cyberbullying158 Be-
fore fourteen-year-old Jamey Rodemeyer committed suicide in Amherst, New 
                                                                                                                           
 149 See Kelly Corrigan, Glendale School District to Monitor Students’ Social Media Posts, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/28/local/la-me-ln-glendale-public-schools-
to-monitor-students-social-media-posts-20130828 (quoting a student’s mother who said that online 
surveillance could be positive if used in moderation and alongside other tools). 
 150 See Sengupta, supra note 23. 
 151 See T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 780, 782 (N.D. Ind. 
2011) (using a risk of a substantial disruption standard); Privacy Policy, supra note 99. 
 152 Steve Annear, Boston College Sexual Assault Confession Deemed ‘Hoax,’ BOSTON MAG. 
(Oct. 2, 2013, 2:55 PM), http://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/blog/2013/10/02/boston-college-
confessions-sexual-assault-hoax; see Ryan, supra note 21. 
 153 See Ryan, supra note 21; see also Eleanor Hildebrandt, ‘Confession’ About Assault Deemed 
Hoax, HEIGHTS, Oct. 3, 2013, at A1, available at http://bcheights.com/news/2013/bc-confession-no-
7122-deemed-hoax/. 
 154 See Ryan, supra note 21. 
 155 Matt Rocheleau, BC Eyes Discipline for Student Who Allegedly Wrote ‘Disturbing,’ but Fake 
Facebook Post About Raping Three Women, BOSTON.COM, (Oct. 2, 2013, 2:13 PM), http://www.
boston.com/yourcampus/news/bc/2013/10/bc_eyes_discipline_for_student_who_allegedly_wrote_
disturbing_but_fake_facebook_post_about_raping_th.html (stating that the student would be “referred 
to the student conduct system for resolution of this matter”). 
 156 Ryan, supra note 21 (reporting that “hundreds of [BC] students planned to meet . . . for a dis-
cussion about the culture of sexual abuse on campus”). 
 157 See Schools, supra note 107. 
 158 See Susan Donaldson James, Jamey Rodemeyer Suicide: Police Consider Criminal Bullying 
Charges, ABC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/jamey-rodemeyer-suicide-ny-
police-open-criminal-investigation/story?id=14580832 (discussing potential criminal charges for 
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York in 2011, one of his peers anonymously posted, “HE MUST DIE!” on a 
public website.159 Because New York State did not have any bullying laws at 
the time, the only way a student could be liable for this speech was through 
aggravated harassment charges.160 But these charges could only have been 
brought following Rodemeyer’s suicide, when the totality of the harassment 
was brought to light; surveillance, arguably, could have highlighted students’ 
public posts earlier and notified school administrators of a threat to student 
safety through cyberbullying.161 
Internet surveillance of students would also target physical threats of vio-
lence against students.162 In late 2007, a student at Loyola Marymount Univer-
sity was arrested after posting a threatening post on JuicyCampus.com, a then-
existing college gossip blog that was accessible to the public.163 The message 
read, “I am going to shoot and kill as many people as I can until which time I 
am incapacitated or killed by the police.”164 The twenty-one-year-old student 
was arrested; it was not determined whether he had any intention to follow 
through on his post.165 
In the debate between free speech and student safety, proponents of Inter-
net surveillance of students argue that students are posting public information 
and holding them accountable for their words is not an invasion of privacy, but 
                                                                                                                           
middle school students who cyberbullied a peer who ultimately killed himself); Schools, supra note 
107. 
 159 James, supra note 158. Several posts had been written on Rodemeyer’s Formspring account, a 
website that allows users to post anonymously. Id. One referenced post stated, “JAMIE IS STUPID, 
GAY, FAT ANND UGLY. HE MUST DIE!” Id. Another stated, “I wouldn’t care if you died. No one 
would. So just do it :) It would make everyone WAY more happier!” Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 See id.; Schools, supra note 107. 
 162 See, e.g., D.J.M., 647 F.3d at 758, 765 (denying First Amendment protection for a student who 
used instant messages to name students he wanted to kill, discussed a specific weapon, and said he 
wanted to make his high school known for something, because it was reasonably foreseeable that his 
threats would cause a risk of substantial disruption within the school). 
 163 Internet-Based Threat Against University Results in Arrest, L.A. POLICE DEP’T (Dec. 8, 
2007), http://www.lapdonline.org/december_2007/news_view/37145. 
 164 Andy Sternberg, LMU Student Arrested in Connection with Campus Shooting Web Post, 
LAIST.COM (Dec. 9, 2007, 4:50 AM), http://laist.com/2007/12/09/lmu_carlos_huerta.php. 
 165 Internet-Based Threat Against University Results in Arrest, supra note 163. Similarly, in 2008, 
a Colgate University student accessed Juicy Campus and criticized the site because anyone could 
access it and potentially threaten a school shooting. See Jeff Young, Colgate U. Student’s Violent 
Message to a Gossip Web Site Leads to His Arrest, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., (Mar. 12, 2008, 3:41 
PM), http://chronicle.com/blogPost/Colgate-U-Student-s-Violent/3756. The posting stated: 
I wonder if i could shut down the school . . . by saying I’m going to shoot as many peo-
ple as i can in my second class tomorrow. I hope I get more than 50 [ ]. For liability 
reasons and ip tracking I won’t leave it at that. But seriously, this site is ridiculous, if it 
got big, and someone put the effort into writing a big long serious suicide note inform-
ing all readers that he would kill over 100 kids, they could shut down the school. Nice. 
Id. The student was tracked through his IP address and arrested. Id. 
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rather a lesson in the consequences that constitutionally guaranteed free speech 
could produce.166 On the other hand, courts have established that schools must 
be careful not to penalize a student just because he expresses something with 
which the school disagrees.167 If surveillance was truly implemented in a de-
liberate way with a high threshold, it could help schools intervene to curb ex-
treme cyberbullying as in the case of Rodemeyer, look for school shooting dis-
cussion as in Columbine and other tragedies, and monitor harmful sexual dis-
cussions that champion rape and other sexual issues. 168 
C. Drawbacks of Using Professional Surveillance 
Despite these benefits, there are many drawbacks to using surveillance, 
including upkeep.169 Although an unrelated professional cannot judge a stu-
dent, he also has no context with which to understand the school, student body, 
or specific student.170 Knowledge of gossip within a school, student interac-
tions, upcoming school events, or even school traditions would be necessary to 
fully understand situations.171 Context is key in these evaluations, and a pro-
fessional monitoring service requires constant communication with its clients 
in order to learn the required context.172 
A threshold concern in implementing student Internet surveillance is 
whether it intrudes on students’ free speech rights.173 Internet surveillance 
could chill free speech, as students would know that their posts were moni-
tored and consequently could choose not to express their thoughts on the Inter-
                                                                                                                           
 166 See Privacy Breach or Public Safety? Teens’ Facebook Posts Monitored by School District, 
NBC NEWS (Sept. 16, 2013, 12:17 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/privacy-breach-or-
public-safety-teens-facebook-posts-monitored-school-8C11167659 (quoting a sixteen-year-old, who 
stated, “[w]e all know social media is not a private place, not really a safe place”). 
 167 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266; Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing 
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 273 and quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514) (stating that generally, “[t]he 
closer expression comes to school-sponsored speech, the less likely the First Amendment protects it 
. . . [a]nd the less the speech has to do with the curriculum and school-sponsored activities, the less 
likely any suppression will further a ‘legitimate pedagogical concern’ . . .”). 
 168 See generally Sengupta, supra note 23 (describing areas that online surveillance targets). 
 169 See Glendale’s Cyber-Nosey Schools, supra note 136. 
 170 See ROBYN S. HESS ET AL., COUNSELING CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN SCHOOLS 10 
(2012) (noting that counselors balance the context of a student’s academic, career, social and emo-
tional considerations). 
 171 See id. 
 172 See id. It is unclear whether any of the online monitoring companies attempt to learn back-
ground information about the schools that they target. See Schools, supra note 107. If a school em-
ploys an online monitoring company, it should provide that company background about the de-
mographics of the school and school-specific jargon, and keep the company abreast of major school 
events or scandals so that the company may monitor in an educated manner. See id. 
 173 See Glendale’s Cyber-Nosey Schools, supra note 136; Glendale School District Monitoring 
Students’ Social Media with Geo Listening, supra note 110 (discussing American Civil Liberties Un-
ion comment that Glendale Unified School District’s use of social media surveillance is questionable). 
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net.174 Moreover, critics have argued that Internet surveillance could lead to the 
fabrication of claims, and educators’ consequential preoccupation with these 
claims, instead of focusing on educating students.175 Surveillance could also 
erode trust between school employees and students, the latter feeling as though 
they were being spied upon.176 Some worry that student privacy is being in-
vaded generally, even despite the public nature of the posts.177 
Another consideration is the lack of proven results of surveillance.178 Pre-
liminary results are unavailable as to whether student surveillance has been 
successful, and the Superintendent of the Glendale Unified School District 
stated that to his knowledge, no student had been disciplined after Geo Listen-
ing found any social media posting as of September 2013.179 Yet given the ease 
with which a student may employ privacy controls on social media, a compa-
ny’s ability to observe many posts is clearly limited.180 In November 2011, the 
Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that sixty-two percent of 
teenagers with a social media profile stated that the profile they use most fre-
quently is set to “private,” enabling only their friends to be able to see their 
posts.181 Similarly, only seventeen percent of teenagers surveyed reported that 
their profiles were set to completely public.182 If students are aware of Internet 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See Glendale’s Cyber-Nosey Schools, supra note 136 (suggesting that surveillance could chill 
free speech); Sengupta, supra note 23 (“[W]hen does protecting children from each other or from 
themselves turn into chilling free speech?”). 
 175 See Glendale’s Cyber-Nosey Schools, supra note 136. Similarly, one may create a fraudulent 
Facebook account with great ease. See Alexis Kleinman, Facebook User Numbers Are Off: Ten Per-
cent of Reported Users Are Not Human, HUFFINGTON POST (May 17, 2013, 11:17 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/17/facebook-user-numbers_n_3292316.html. In May 2013, an estimated 
ten percent of Facebook users were pets or products, not humans. See id. 
 176 See Corrigan, supra note 149; Glendale’s Cyber-Nosey Schools, supra note 136. 
 177 See Calif. School District Pays Firm to Monitor Kids’ Social Media, UNITED PRESS INTERNA-
TIONAL, INC. (Sept. 14, 2013, 2:50 PM), available at http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2013/09/14/
Calif-school-district-pays-firm-to-monitor-kids-social-media/UPI-75701379184611/ (quoting a senior 
staff attorney for the Electronic Frontier foundation, who compared public schools hiring surveillance 
firms to the government hiring a contractor to stalk students’ social media, emphasizing that proac-
tively gathering this information crosses a line); Andy Meek, Glendale School District Hires Firm to 
Monitor Students’ Social Media Use, TIME MAG. (Sept. 14, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/09/14/
glendale-school-district-hires-firm-to-monitor-students-social-media-use/ (stating that Glendale Uni-
fied School District’s decision to use online surveillance has been critiqued as government-sponsored 
stalking, raising privacy concerns for students being monitored). 
 178 See Ceasar, supra note 147. The Superintendent of Glendale Unified School District, Dick 
Sheehan, stated that to his knowledge, as of September 2013, no student had been disciplined after 
Geo Listening found any social media posting. See id. 
 179 See Ceasar, supra note 147. Superintendent Sheehan did claim, however, that a pilot run of the 
service uncovered a student who was contemplating suicide. See Farivar, supra note 104. “We were 
able to save a life,” he reported, as a result of discovering these messages. Id. 
 180 Farivar, supra note 104. Geo Listening’s CEO claimed that if his service inspired students to 
change their settings to private, he would consider it a positive for all involved. See id. 
 181 Amanda Lenhart et al., supra note 13 (also reporting that in 2006, this number was consistent: 
fifty-nine percent). 
 182 Id. 
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surveillance, they may be less likely to post publicly, and thus jeopardize the 
effectiveness of Internet surveillance companies.183 Moreover, public Internet 
posts are just the tip of the iceberg: Internet surveillance companies cannot 
penetrate peer-to-peer messaging through text messages or applications, where 
much of student bullying, online threats, and unsafe conduct occurs.184 
Furthermore, the Third Circuit has held that school administrators’ au-
thority to make decisions regarding their students is not without limits.185 In 
Layshock v. Hermitage School District, the Third Circuit emphasized that alt-
hough students do not shed their constitutional rights at school, “the concept of 
the ‘school yard’ is not without boundaries and the reach of school authorities 
is not without limits.”186 As the reach of authorities is not without limits, so is 
their decision-making ability; schools must not go too far so as to progress be-
yond their mandate of education.187 
Schools must also seriously consider the financial cost of Internet surveil-
lance.188 Internet surveillance companies are for-profit; their services are ex-
pensive and because they aim to make money, they have split motivations.189 
Critics of using district resources to pay for online monitoring point to under-
paid teachers and administrators and unemployed counselors who could make 
a greater impact.190 According to the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, the average American school counselor made approximately 
$53,610 per year as of May 2012.191 Hiring an additional school counselor, 
who perhaps has specialized knowledge of student social media use, may make 
an additional, more personalized impact on a school than a $40,500 annual 
contract with a third party surveillance company.192 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See Glendale’s Cyber-Nosey Schools, supra note 136. In its frequently asked questions, Geo 
Listening explains that part of why students choose to post publicly despite the availability of privacy 
settings is because they seek a public platform. See FAQs, supra note 104. 
 184 See Alvarez, supra note 1. 
 185 See Layshock v. Hermitage School Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 186 Id. 
 187 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336 (recognizing shift away from in loco parentis). 
 188 See Susan J. Demas, Education Is Not a For-profit Business, So Don’t Treat It Like One, 
MLIVE.COM (Sept. 20, 2013, 8:55 AM), http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/09/michigan_
school_cuts_rick_snyd.html (explaining that money does matter to the operation of schools). 
 189 See id. (reminding readers that businesses operate to earn profits while public schools operate 
to educate students). 
 190 See Justin W. Patchin, Should Schools Monitor Students’ Social Media Accounts?, CYBER-
BULLYING RES. CTR. (Sept. 17, 2013), http://cyberbullying.us/schools-monitor-students-social-media-
accounts/. 
 191 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HAND-
BOOK, SCHOOL AND CAREER COUNSELORS, (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/community-and-
social-service/school-and-career-counselors.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2015). 
 192 See Patchin, supra note 190. 
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IV. TAKING ACTION ON STUDENT INTERNET BEHAVIOR: SUPREME COURT 
CERTIORARI AND, IN ITS ABSENCE, COUNSELORS IN LIEU OF  
PROFESSIONAL SURVEILLANCE 
Given the pervasiveness of the Internet in students’ lives, the complicated 
nature of student free speech, and the dubious constitutionality and efficacy of 
professional student surveillance efforts, the Supreme Court made a significant 
error in denying certiorari for Internet cases involving student free speech.193 
The lack of guidance leaves schools in limbo, fearful of overstepping their 
boundaries or not acting in time to prevent student harm.194 To solve these is-
sues, the Supreme Court must grant certiorari to student Internet speech cas-
es. 195 In doing so, the Court should adopt the risk of substantial disruption 
standard as laid out in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District and its progeny.196 Additionally, schools should instruct their students 
and educators in social media and Internet usage, and prioritize the use of 
skilled and technology-savvy guidance counselors instead of diverting re-
sources to for-profit surveillance companies.197 
A. The Supreme Court Must Rule on Student Internet Posts That Affect 
School Environments and Adopt a Risk of Substantial  
Disruption Standard 
Students’ constant use of the Internet, originating for some as early as el-
ementary school, begs the attention of legislatures and courts.198 After pointing 
                                                                                                                           
 193 See Kravets, supra note 24 (discussing the lack of Supreme Court guidance and opposite deci-
sions that lower courts have made from similar fact patterns using the Tinker standard). 
 194 See id.; see also Wynar ex rel. Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (likening the limbo to “a feat like tightrope balancing, where an error in judgment can lead 
to a tragic result”); Sengupta, supra note 23. 
 195 See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., concur-
ring). 
 196 See id. 
 197 See Robert Bardwell, A Plea for More School Counselors, NYTIMES BLOG (Oct. 25, 2010, 
3:56 PM), http://thechoice.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/25/counselor-2/. Robert Bardwell noted that 
students “need counselors now more than ever because of the complex and complicated society in 
which we live.” Id. 
 198 See David L. Hudson Jr., Time for the Supreme Court to Address Off-Campus, Online Student 
Speech, 91 OR. L. REV. 621, 625 (2012) (arguing that First Amendment and Fourth Amendment is-
sues should push the Supreme Court to analyze off-campus online speech); Easton, supra note 49, at 
18. In a 2010 Comment, James M. Patrick noted some of the issues that arise as a result of the lack of 
Supreme Court guidance. See James M. Patrick, Comment, The Civility Police: The Rising Need to 
Balance Students’ Rights to Off-Campus Internet Speech Against the School’s Compelling Interests, 
79 U. CIN. L. REV. 855, 878 (2010). Notably, he states, “[T]he lower courts inconsistently apply the 
existing student speech framework and reach different conclusions. Further complicating the problem 
is that ‘courts have interpreted differently the distinction between on-campus and off-campus speech, 
with some courts defining on-campus speech much more expansively than other courts.’” See id. 
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out the abundance of lower court cases and their inconsistent results, the peti-
tion for certiorari for Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools trumpeted its case’s 
merits as “an appropriate vehicle to address . . . inconsistent lower court deci-
sions and provide badly-needed guidance on First Amendment protections af-
forded to student speech that takes place away from school grounds.”199 In-
deed, as constitutional law scholar Professor Frederick Schauer pointed out in 
a 2007 article, there has been more litigation in lower courts over student 
speech since the ruling in Tinker than on most other free speech areas, includ-
ing obscenity, defamation, commercial advertising, and campaign finance.200 
Given social media’s prevalence, students’ speech through social media consti-
tutes a large portion of the most recently decided student speech cases.201 The 
last time that the Supreme Court ruled on anything relating to student speech 
was in 2008, in a case involving a banner at a school-sponsored event; no 
technology was involved there.202 
In his concurrence in Morse v. Frederick, Supreme Court Justice Clarence 
Thomas highlighted the precise problem with the current jurisprudence around 
student speech: “I am afraid that our jurisprudence now says that students have 
a right to speak in schools except when they do not—a standard continuously 
developed through litigation against local schools and their administrators.”203 
It is time to give students, schools, and parents Supreme Court guidance.204 
                                                                                                                           
(quoting Kara D. Williams, Comment, Public Schools v. MySpace & Facebook: The Newest Chal-
lenge to Student Speech Rights, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 707, 720 (2008)). 
 199 Kowalski Certiorari Petition, supra note 24, at 3; see also Easton, supra note 49, at 18 (point-
ing out the inconsistent lower court decisions around online student speech). An amicus brief in the 
Kowalski case echoed the sentiments expressed in its petition for certiorari: “The bottom line is that 
teens and technology have outstripped the law in this area. The Court should grant Petitioner’s Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari to begin the work of playing legal catch-up.” See Brief for Marion B. 
Brechner as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 
(4th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-461). 
 200 Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007 SUP. CT. 
REV. 205, 208–09. 
 201 See, e.g., Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216 (involving MySpace comments made off-campus); Nixon 
v. Hardin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 988 F. Supp. 2d 826, 830–31 (W.D. Tenn. 2013) (involving Twitter 
posts made off-campus by a student); T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch., 807 F. Supp. 2d 
767, 772 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (involving photos posted off-campus to PhotoBucket and other public 
sites). 
 202 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (involving a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS” at a school-related viewing of the Olympic torch run). In this case, because the banner was at 
a school-sponsored event, the school principal was justified in asking the student to remove the ban-
ner, as it advocated drug use. See id. at 397. Given that this is the last free speech case ruled upon by 
the Supreme Court, not only are parents often out of touch with their students’ online lives, but the 
Court is out of touch with the reality of what students, administrators, and parents have to handle. See 
Kowalski Certiorari Petition, supra note 24, at 3. 
 203 Morse, 551 U.S. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 204 See Kowalski Certiorari Petition, supra note 24, at 3. 
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1. Potential Standards to Adopt 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of student social media usage could result 
in several different standards to guide school decision making for student pun-
ishment.205 Instead of a Tinker substantial disruption extension, the Court 
could create an entirely new standard.206 
One potential standard is purposeful direction, as proposed by several 
scholars who adapted a decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit as the standard’s basis.207 In a case about a student underground 
newspaper, the Seventh Circuit focused on dissemination, stating that because 
a student intentionally disseminated his newspaper on campus, school officials 
had the authority to act on it.208 Applying this idea to student Internet speech, 
scholars established the purposeful direction standard, which asks whether a 
student purposefully directed his Internet speech to a school’s campus.209 A 
purposeful direction standard requires a student to bring the content to school 
through email transmission, the viewing of the content at school, or the direc-
tion of others to view the content.210 Because the author’s direction is the focus 
of this test, simply discussing the content of the online speech would presuma-
bly be insufficient, as would the introduction of the speech to a school campus 
by a third party.211 The author must have acted in a way that directs its content 
to the schools through an affirmative step.212 The purposeful direction standard 
allows for student free speech while still ensuring that schools may continue to 
discipline students for speech that constitutes a true threat.213 This standard 
would be a dramatic departure from Tinker, under which courts have justified 
discipline based on any incidental knowledge of off-campus Internet speech—
                                                                                                                           
 205 See Ceglia, supra note 28, at 943 (outlining two main tests that would be derived from Tinker 
and could be used by the Supreme Court to analyze of off-campus speech). 
 206 See, e.g., Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1065 (employing a risk of substantial disruption standard); 
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 214 (using, in part, a nexus standard); Lowery ex rel. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 
F.3d 584, 592 (6th Cir. 2007) (involving a risk of substantial disruption). In Morse, the Supreme Court 
recognized that Tinker is not the only basis to restrict student speech. 551 U.S. at 405. 
 207 See Lindsay J. Gower, Note, Blue Mountain School District v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder: Will the 
Supreme Court Provide Clarification for Public School Officials Regarding Off-Campus Internet 
Speech?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 709, 729 (2013); see also Alexander G. Tuneski, Note, Online, Not on 
Grounds: Protecting Student Internet Speech, 89 VA. L. REV. 139, 177–78 (2003). 
 208 Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 1998). Although this case did not involve 
Internet speech, the Seventh Circuit judged its merits based on a “reasonable forecast of disruption.” 
See id. at 828. 
 209 See Gower, supra note 207, at 725–26. 
 210 See id.at 726; see also Tuneski, supra note 207, at 142. 
 211 See Gower, supra note 207, at 726. 
 212 See id.; see also Tuneski, supra note 207, at 142. 
 213 See Gower, supra note 207, at 730. A true threat analysis is not mutually exclusive with a 
purposeful direction standard. See id. (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 620 
(5th Cir. 2004)). 
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whether brought to the school’s attention by a parent or other student—as long 
as it causes a school disruption.214 
A second standard has also yet to be supported by circuit courts: blanket 
protection of all student Internet speech performed off-campus.215 This stand-
ard would create a clear, predictable line that protects student Internet speech 
as long as the speech was not authored on school property.216 Under blanket 
protection, threats of violence could still be regulated under the existing true 
threat analysis, wherein schools could act when a student makes a credible and 
imminent threat against the school environment.217 First Amendment advocates 
that support this standard include the five judges who concurred in the Third 
Circuit’s J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District.218 These five 
judges voiced fears of overreaching by schools when disciplining students for 
Internet speech: “Applying Tinker to off-campus speech would . . . empower 
schools to regulate students’ expressive activity no matter where it takes place, 
when it occurs, or what subject matter it involves—so long as it causes a sub-
stantial disruption at school.”219 
A third test was advanced by the Supreme Court in Bethel School District 
Number 403 v. Fraser: a school may punish student speech that “would un-
dermine the school’s basic educational mission.”220 Fraser involved a sexually 
                                                                                                                           
 214 See, e.g., D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 765 (8th Cir. 
2011) (using risk of substantial disruption standard in case in which instant messages were all trans-
mitted off-campus but were brought to the attention of school administration). 
 215 See Patrick, supra note 198, at 894 (discussing a requirement that speech be on-campus before 
it may be regulated); Matthew I. Schiffhauer, Note, Uncertainty at the “Outer Boundaries” of the 
First Amendment: Extending the Arm of School Authority Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate into Cyber-
space, 24 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 731, 758 (2010) (discussing the fear that administrators will arbitrar-
ily discipline students if the student ridicules anything about the school). 
 216 See Goldman, supra note 35, at 408; Patrick, supra note 198, at 894. Lee Goldman advocates 
for First Amendment protection for student off-campus speech unless made it is made under the su-
pervision of a school employee. Goldman, supra note 35, at 408. 
 217 See Goldman, supra note 35, at 409, 411; Patrick, supra note 198, at 858. Goldman concedes 
that off-campus speech could result in a substantial disruption of schooling, despite not rising to the 
level of “true threat.” See Goldman, supra note 35, at 408. Yet he maintains that the substantial dis-
ruption test goes too far at the expense of free speech. See id. As previously discussed, the Eighth 
Circuit applied both the substantial disruption test and the true threat test simultaneously in its 2011 
decision for D.J.M. 647 F.3d at 764, 766. There, the student’s instant messages threatening violence 
caused both a substantial disruption within the school and “significant disruption and fear” constitut-
ing a true threat. See id. The court did not feel it necessary to evaluate whether the student would 
actually carry out his threat; the risk of the threat was serious enough to warrant police referral and 
school suspension. See id. at 764–65. 
 218 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 939 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., 
concurring). 
 219 Id. Judges Fuentes, Hardiman, and Sloviter, along with Chief Judge McKee, joined Judge 
Smith’s concurrence. Id. at 936. 
 220 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); see also Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 
599 (W.D. Pa. 2007). 
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explicit speech by a student at a mandatory school assembly, where students as 
young as fourteen years old were captive listeners.221 Fraser discussed Tinker 
at length, but instead of explicitly adopting Tinker, it focused on a school’s 
ability to protect its students from sexually explicit speech.222 Indeed, the 
Court affirmed an interest in shielding minors from vulgar and offensive 
speech, though it did not explicitly include schools as protective agents.223 The 
Court held that the student’s “offensively lewd and indecent speech” under-
mined the school’s fundamental values, and, as such, was permissible as a ba-
sis for discipline.224 In its holding, however, the Fraser court did not specify 
that a school had to adopt its own values specifically, but rather it could disci-
pline speech that was “wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of 
public school education [generally].”225 Application of this value-based stand-
ard to all speech could allow any school to claim a set of conveniently broad 
and vague values, and consequently could cause a flood of litigation for 
courts.226 To avoid this, the Supreme Court could explicitly specify which val-
ues are fundamental, or it could leave it to the lower courts to subjectively ana-
lyze those values on a case-by-case basis.227 
2. The Supreme Court Should Adapt the Tinker Risk of Substantial 
Disruption to Student Internet Speech 
In consideration of all of these standards, the Supreme Court should simp-
ly adapt Tinker to modern times and extend the substantial disruption test to 
off-campus speech.228 In this approach, students’ off-campus Internet speech 
would be treated as any other campus speech, and would follow circuit courts 
that applied the Tinker test to off-campus Internet speech.229 Many courts have 
held that an actual substantial disruption is not required; rather, the risk of a 
substantial disruption is sufficient to justify schools in curbing or punishing 
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student online speech.230 The risk of substantial disruption standard is often 
discussed in cases that involve violent threats that require timely responses.231 
The Tinker risk of substantial disruption standard would be friendlier to 
schools than other proposals, granting them more deference when safety is at 
stake.232 Because the risk of disruption still must be substantial, however, stu-
dents’ free speech rights would not be unnecessarily curtailed.233 
In a concurrence to the Third Circuit’s decision in Layshock v. Hermitage 
School District, Judge Kent A. Jordan advocated for the adoption of Tinker to 
student Internet speech, explaining that Tinker aimed to balance school order 
with free speech, and highlighting the challenges of Internet speech.234 Judge 
Jordan compared Internet student speech to an individual shouting “fire” in a 
movie theater: if that person were standing outside of the theater shouting 
“fire” into the building, the speech would not be protected solely because the 
speaker was not in the building.235 Thus, “it is hard to see how words that may 
cause pandemonium in a public school would be protected by the First 
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that the substantial disruption test was not met, and there was an insufficient nexus to the school. See 
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uting factor. See id. The subjectivity of this test may be inefficient for administrators, preventing them 
from action even if disruption occurs but is incidental to the school. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 409. 
 234 Layshock, 650 F.3d at 221 (Jordan, J., concurring) (explaining that the need to balance free 
speech with order in public schools “is the problem Tinker aimed to address and it is the problem we 
are confronting too, so we should be applying rather than avoiding Tinker”). 
 235 Id. at 221–22. 
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Amendment simply because technology now allows the timing and distribution 
of a shout to be controlled by someone beyond the campus boundary.”236 
Extending the risk of substantial disruption standard to student Internet 
speech would provide uniform guidelines to schools and enable teachers and 
administrators to quickly respond to problematic issues.237 The Morse court 
highlighted the difficulty that school administrators face, in that they must be 
able to quickly respond to pressing student issues without fear of liability when 
students’ safety, including long-term safety, is at issue.238 A risk of substantial 
disruption standard would sweep in higher standards as well; any risk of im-
minent threat or true threat would clearly create a risk of substantial disruption 
within a school and could also be addressed through this standard.239 
The Court must be careful not to carve out space for schools to discipline 
a student for offensive speech.240 As the Court warned in Morse, that which 
each person judges as offensive is different: “much political and religious 
speech might be perceived as offensive to some.”241 Therefore, the Court 
should adopt the Tinker standard with strict language that qualifies what a sub-
stantial disruption would mean in light of the ease with which a student may 
post online, which ultimately results in a great deal of student speech with a 
traceable record.242 
3. The Survival of Surveillance Companies If a Risk of Substantial 
Disruption Standard Is Applied 
Internet surveillance companies’ success depends on the standards that 
circuit and district courts have established for a school’s action on students’ 
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Internet speech.243 If a risk of substantial disruption standard is adopted by the 
Court as suggested above, Internet surveillance could operate just as it claims to 
presently: companies could peruse the public posts of students and report those 
posts that it deems pose a risk of substantial disruption within a school.244 Still, 
as with all standards, Internet surveillance would be limited to public posts, 
thus calling the effectiveness of the operation into question.245 
B. Professional Surveillance of Student Posts: Expensive, Untested, and 
Easily Replaced by Education and Counselors 
Proponents of professional surveillance of students’ Internet postings jus-
tify these services through the public nature of students’ posts, claiming that 
surveillance does not intrude on any student privacy.246 Still, surveillance is 
limited in its effectiveness because of privacy settings, its significant price tag, 
and the lack of proof that it is more effective than peer reporting.247 With these 
problems and the absence of Supreme Court guidance, schools should pursue 
the promotion of safer social media interaction amongst students using educa-
tion and effective counselors.248 
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Instead of employing a for-profit company at an annual cost of over 
$40,000, schools with money in their budget should look to professional coun-
selors to be a physical presence on campus.249 Counselors are well-tested: they 
have been standard in most public schools since the late twentieth century and 
their presence has proven to be effective in supporting and guiding students.250 
Young counselors grew up with the Internet and generally can grasp the signif-
icance of digital socialization for students, while more experienced counselors 
could be required to take social media training so that they are up-to-date with 
the technology that their students use.251 Counselors could be tasked with the 
role of general therapy or may be chosen to specialize in social media, so that 
students are comfortable with the concept of sharing any issues that they may 
encounter.252 Moreover, being physically on campus, interacting and collabo-
rating with faculty, and keeping an open-door policy may encourage student 
discussion.253 With enough attention given to cyberbullying and threats of vio-
lence, students may be more likely to discuss gossip, observed bullying, or 
other threats of violence that may surface.254 Counselors also have the added 
advantage of context: they know how class schedules are structured, under-
stand the general culture of a school and what community issues are occurring 
that could impact students, and see students in both emotional and academic 
counseling.255 
Educating students about social media use could also assist in improving 
awareness of the consequences of misbehavior, and could encourage open dia-
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logue relating to cyberbullying.256 In September 2012, the New Jersey Assem-
bly introduced Bill No. 3292, which proposed a requirement for school dis-
tricts to teach students in grades six through eight responsible social media use 
as a part of the state’s Core Curriculum Content Standards in Technology.257 
The bill was passed by the Assembly and nearly unanimously passed by the 
New Jersey Senate in January 2014.258 It outlines training on cyber safety, se-
curity, and “cyber ethics,” along with information on negative consequences of 
the failure to use social media responsibly.259 The Baby Boomer generation 
took classes in Home Economics; Generations Y and Z may need education on 
social media.260 
With schools at a loss regarding whether their punishment or proactive 
surveillance of students is constitutional, education is one of the safest ways to 
attempt to cut back on student Internet misconduct, without the risk of eroding 
student trust or chilling student speech.261 By using budgetary resources to ed-
ucate students on correct Internet usage and to train faculty, staff, and counse-
lors in technology-based socialization, schools can attempt to bridge the gap 
between students and adults.262 Additionally, training can educate older profes-
sionals who have opted to ignore the reality of the Internet age; exposing older 
teachers to social media and online resources may even enhance their teaching 
methods.263 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite the Internet’s prevalence in American culture and particularly 
among American youth, the Supreme Court has repeatedly denied certiorari for 
cases involving student Internet free speech. Instead, lower courts must rely on 
speech standards laid out in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, a case that predates the Internet’s emergence by several dec-
ades. In other areas of law, such reliance on outdated precedence would be un-
acceptable. Imagine contraceptive law without guidance on the Pill, or family 
law without attention paid to the high national rate of divorce.264 Jurisprudence 
on student speech must include Internet speech. 
Given the mushrooming litigation surrounding student Internet conduct, 
the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to cases involving the subject. Clari-
ty about student Internet speech would update law that is nearly fifty years old. 
In doing so, the standard for penalizing student Internet speech must be high: 
student speech should not be chilled for anything less than a risk of substantial 
disruption or reasonable threat of imminent violence. Such a standard would 
correlate with the gravity of First Amendment concerns and the necessity of 
deliberation and process that must occur before any deprivation of a student’s 
education. The Supreme Court has ample precedent to follow, both in its pre-
vious non-Internet jurisprudence and from the circuits, to support adoption of 
this standard. 
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, schools that wish to proactive-
ly address any negative effects of off-campus student Internet speech should 
turn away from professional surveillance services. Professional student surveil-
lance is untested, expensive, and jeopardizes the trust that students feel toward 
their school. Instead, trained, skilled counselors may be hired at a similar price 
to the cost of surveillance services, and counselors have the added benefit of 
being physically present in a school. Professional surveillance pairs budget-
tight schools with for-profit companies that are neither in touch with the daily 
happenings of the school nor available to actually interact with students. Alter-
natively, if a school has the resources to afford a professional surveillance 
company, it should channel those resources to Internet education for students 
and teachers and to the hiring and support of counselors. 
The Tinker court called schools the “marketplace of ideas,” highlighting 
the important learning and experimentation that students undertake through 
formal education. In promoting this important learning, schools must balance 
student free speech with the need to protect the school population from harm-
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ful disruptions. The Supreme Court must abandon its current strategy of ignor-
ing technology and instead aid students and schools by providing guidance on 
student Internet speech. Until the Supreme Court grants certiorari on student 
Internet speech cases, a standard from 1969 will be applied to a quintessential-
ly millennial issue. 
